Graham William Phillips v The Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs

The Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 authorises regulations which may interfere with freedom of expression, where that intention arises by necessary implication from the statutory scheme and legislative context. Regulation 6(3)(a) of the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 can apply to expression that supports or promotes policies destabilising Ukraine.

Such powers remain subject to the Human Rights Act 1998, the legality requirement and proportionality. The court must assess proportionality itself, while giving particular weight to executive assessments involving national security and foreign policy. Sanctions imposed on a person materially supporting Russia’s propaganda war were lawful and proportionate.

The claimant, who described himself as a journalist reporting from Russian-controlled areas of Ukraine, challenged the decision to maintain his designation under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. His designation imposed an asset freeze and substantially affected his income, property and family life.

He argued that the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 and the 2019 Regulations did not authorise sanctions in response to political expression, or were unlawful under articles 8 and 10 and article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR. The central issues were statutory vires, legality, foreseeability and proportionality.

1. Statutory authority. The 2018 Act authorises regulations imposing financial sanctions on persons reasonably suspected of being involved in specified activities. Although the word “activity” is insufficient by itself to override fundamental rights, the statutory scheme, its purpose, and the legislative intention to replicate the former EU sanctions framework establish by necessary implication that regulations may affect freedom of expression.
2. 2019 Regulations. Regulation 6(3)(a) naturally extends to expression. A person may “provide support for” or “promote” a destabilising policy or action through speech, including by disseminating propaganda. The provision is not confined to commercial or financial support. It remains subject to the Human Rights Act 1998 and may be used only compatibly with Convention rights.
3. Legality. The 2018 Act and the 2019 Regulations are accessible and sufficiently foreseeable. The designation criteria are constrained by reasonable suspicion, the statutory purpose, publication and reasons, review and revocation mechanisms, exceptions, licensing arrangements and judicial review. Mere political dissent, without further critical context, would not satisfy the relevant criteria or justify designation.
4. Proportionality. Applying the four-stage test in Bank Mellat v Her Majesty’s Treasury (No 2) [2013] UKSC 39, the objective of encouraging Russia to cease actions destabilising Ukraine was sufficiently important and fell within national security. The claimant’s designation was rationally connected to that objective as part of a wider sanctions package. Removing online content was not shown to be a less intrusive and equally effective measure.
5. The designation significantly interfered with property and family-life rights, and interfered to a lesser extent with freedom of expression. The claimant’s conduct materially supported Russia’s propaganda war and did not attract the highest protection afforded to responsible political journalism. Giving significant weight to the executive’s assessment in foreign-policy and national-security matters, the court concluded that a fair balance had been struck.
6. The continued designation was therefore lawful, compatible with the ECHR and not unlawful on any public-law ground. The application to set aside the decision was refused.

First-instance judicial review proceedings under section 38 of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018. The application to set aside the decision maintaining the designation was refused.