Sarvar Ismailov (No 2) V Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs

The family-association criterion in the Russia sanctions regime is sufficiently accessible and foreseeable to satisfy ECHR legality. Its use is not disproportionate at the legislative level because it is capable of compatible operation in all or almost all cases and is subject to statutory safeguards.

Under [2025] UKSC 30, the court makes its own proportionality assessment while allowing the executive a wide margin in foreign-policy and sanctions judgments. A designation may rationally contribute to the cumulative effect of a sanctions regime even if it cannot itself change Russian policy. Officials may exercise ministerial sanctions functions under the Carltona principle unless Parliament clearly requires personal decision-making. The Public Sector Equality Duty is primarily directed to policy decisions, has no extraterritorial effect, and does not require an individualised assessment for every designation.

The claimant challenged the Secretary of State’s decision to maintain his designation under section 38(1) of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018. He had been designated under regulation 6 of the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 because he was the nephew of an involved person, following amendments introducing immediate family membership as a form of association.

Seven grounds were advanced: legality and proportionality of the family criterion; ultra vires; personal decision-making under the Carltona principle; proportionality, irrationality and arbitrariness of maintaining the designation; and breach of the Public Sector Equality Duty. The central issues were whether the amended regulations were lawful and whether the individual maintenance decision complied with public law and Convention standards.

1. Outcome. The application for review was dismissed on all seven grounds.
2. The family-association provisions were clear and foreseeable. The fact that designation could be triggered by family relationship rather than individual conduct did not make the law uncertain. The public-law principle of legality was a rule of construction, not an independent ground for invalidating subordinate legislation. The statutory scheme was also capable of compatible operation in all or almost all cases, so the ab ante proportionality challenge failed.
3. Section 45(2)(a) of SAMLA required the Minister to consider whether the Russia Regulations, as amended, remained sanctions regulations and were appropriate for their stated purpose. The evidence showed that this question had been considered. SAMLA created an independent domestic sanctions regime and imposed no continuing requirement to mirror EU law.
4. The Carltona principle applied. Officials may perform ministerial functions unless the statutory language or framework clearly excludes that course. The seriousness of designation did not require personal ministerial decision-making, and requiring personal decisions for the large number of sanctions cases would make the system unworkable.
5. Applying the four limbs in Bank Mellat, maintaining the designation pursued a legitimate objective, was rationally connected to that objective, had no sufficiently effective less intrusive alternative, and struck a fair balance. The designation could contribute to the cumulative pressure of the sanctions regime, discourage sanctions circumvention and influence associated persons.
6. The decision was rational and not arbitrary. Non-designated comparators had not been shown to be materially identical, and the executive was entitled to make a multifactorial case-by-case selection.
7. The PSED had been discharged in relation to the regulations. It did not apply extraterritorially to the claimant’s individual designation decisions, and no separate assessment was required for each individual designation. Relief would in any event have been refused under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981.

First-instance statutory review. The application under section 38(1) of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 was dismissed.