Dana Astra IOOO v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs

Article 1 ECHR jurisdiction is principally territorial. A domestic sanctions decision affecting a person or its interests abroad does not, without more, establish extraterritorial jurisdiction. The Convention does not recognise future income, reputation, or goodwill unsupported by an existing local business as a protected possession under A1P1.

Where sanctions are challenged, the Bank Mellat proportionality test applies where Convention rights are engaged. The statutory classification of a person as falling within a lawful sanctions regime is an important factor. In foreign-policy matters, the Secretary of State receives a broad margin of discretion, and sanctions may rationally pursue deterrent and signalling effects. Historic conduct may support designation where the statutory scheme expressly permits it.

Dana Astra IOOO, a Belarusian construction company, challenged its designation under the Republic of Belarus (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. The designation imposed asset-freezing and related restrictions under regulations made pursuant to the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018.

The claimant alleged unlawful interference with Article 1 and A1P1 ECHR rights, disproportionate treatment, retrospectivity and irrationality. It relied principally on its sponsorship of the Belarusian National Olympic Committee and its involvement in the Minsk World construction project. The central issues were whether the designation engaged Convention jurisdiction, whether it was proportionate, and whether the Secretary of State had acted irrationally.

1. Claim dismissed. The designation was lawful and proportionate, and the rationality challenge failed.
2. Article 1 ECHR jurisdiction is primarily territorial. Extraterritorial jurisdiction arises only in exceptional categories requiring special justification, such as effective control over territory or persons, the exercise of public powers abroad, or specified diplomatic and consular conduct. The fact that a state can take a decision affecting a person or its interests abroad is insufficient. Sanctions do not create a new general exception.
3. Nada concerned attribution of measures implementing a United Nations resolution and did not decide the extraterritorial jurisdiction issue. Al-Dulimi was materially different because the property was located in Switzerland.
4. DANA had no assets or established business in the United Kingdom. Goodwill under A1P1 is limited to the marketable and presently capitalisable product of past work and reputation. Future earning capacity and unsupported reputation are not possessions. The alleged impact on Belarusian goodwill could not establish United Kingdom jurisdiction.
5. The court nevertheless considered proportionality. The four Bank Mellat limbs were satisfied. The statutory scheme identified a legitimate foreign-policy objective; designation was rationally connected to deterrent and signalling effects; less intrusive alternatives would have been less effective; and the effects of designation did not outweigh the public interest. The court was required to make its own assessment but accorded considerable weight to executive foreign-policy judgments. The efficacy of each individual designation did not need to be demonstrated where sanctions operated cumulatively.
6. The fact that sanctions were severe or open-ended did not make them disproportionate. Difficulties in obtaining licences to pay legal fees were not a reason to invalidate designation, and detriments imposed by Belarus were irrelevant because they were not caused by the United Kingdom designation.
7. The designation based on historic conduct was not retrospective punishment. Section 11 of SAMLA and the Regulations expressly contemplated past involvement. The absence of a policy did not itself make the decision arbitrary, and the alleged comparators were not shown to be sufficiently similar.
8. The separate rationality ground added nothing and failed, particularly because the designation was proportionate and rational reasons had been given.
9. The application to redact officials’ names was granted under CPR 79.24. The Secretary of State showed good and specific national-security reasons, and the marginal relevance of the names was outweighed by the identified risks.

First-instance judicial review claim. No prior appellate decision is stated in the judgment.