Anzhelika Khan v The Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs

The statutory purpose of sanctions designation is furthered where a person satisfies the prescribed criteria, including association with an involved person. The Secretary of State need not demonstrate the likely efficacy of each individual designation through a granular assessment of that person’s ability to influence the foreign state. The statutory purpose and the proportionality safeguard provide the necessary individual focus.

Sanctions legislation is not unlawful merely because its application cannot be predicted in every detail. Accessibility, published reasons, common-law judicial review, proportionality review and statutory review rights may provide adequate safeguards against arbitrariness. In assessing proportionality, the court must consider the wider sanctions strategy, including indirect levers of pressure and available licensing arrangements, while giving appropriate weight to executive expertise in foreign affairs.

The claimant, a British citizen and the wife of a designated Russian businessman, was designated under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 as a person associated with an involved person. Her designation imposed asset-freeze, transport and trust-services sanctions. Following a ministerial review under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, the Secretary of State decided to take no action.

Under section 38 of SAMLA, she sought judicial review of that decision. She argued that the Secretary of State had failed to consider whether her individual designation furthered the statutory purpose; that the designation regime was insufficiently foreseeable and arbitrary; that association was an incompatible designation criterion; and that the interference with her Article 8 and A1P1 rights was disproportionate.

1. Ground 1 dismissed. The Padfield principle required the Secretary of State to exercise the designation power so as to further the purpose in regulation 4. That purpose did not require a detailed or nuanced assessment of whether designating this particular person was likely, by itself, to alter Russian policy. Satisfaction of the designation criteria provided a proper prima facie basis for designation. That indication could be displaced by material showing that the person was inapt to serve the statutory purpose, such as a wholly ruptured family relationship. No such material existed here. The decision documents nevertheless considered the claimant’s association, assets and the possible contribution of her designation to the sanctions strategy.
2. The challenge to the quality of law of the regime failed. The designation provisions were accessible and operated within a clear legal framework. Exact prediction of every designation was unnecessary. Published reasons, the designation criteria, common-law controls, proportionality review and the review and court procedures under SAMLA supplied safeguards against arbitrary exercise of the discretion.
3. The challenge to regulation 6(2)(d) was also rejected. The criterion of association reflected the structure of section 11(3) SAMLA. In any event, an ab ante challenge could succeed only if the provision was incapable of being operated compatibly with Convention rights in all or most cases. That high threshold was not met.
4. The designation was rationally connected to the statutory objective. The sanctions regime operated through cumulative and indirect levers of pressure. Possible mechanisms included discouraging the receipt or transfer of benefits, constraining sanctions evasion, encouraging influence upon the primary target, and signalling consequences to similarly situated persons. The assessment of those foreign-policy mechanisms attracted considerable respect.
5. The fair-balance challenge failed. The objective was of the highest importance and less intrusive measures were not shown to be equally effective. The serious effects on the claimant and her children were fully recognised, but licensing arrangements, access to healthcare and education, and the temporary nature of an asset freeze were material mitigations. The Secretary of State had not failed to strike a fair balance between individual rights and the community interest. The claim was dismissed.

First-instance judicial review under section 38 of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018. The judgment refers to earlier sanctions decisions, including [2023] EWHC 2121 (Admin) and [2024] EWHC 32 (Admin), as guidance.