ZS v The Estate of NJ

On an application for a declaration of parentage, the ordinary civil standard applies. The court must be satisfied that the evidence reliably establishes the alleged parentage. A DNA report may be insufficient where its description of the testing process creates uncertainty about whose DNA was examined, particularly where relevant corroborative evidence is absent.

Applications for declarations of parentage should ordinarily name as respondents both the putative father and the mother, subject to the applicable procedural rules. Where the putative father is deceased, the estate should ordinarily be represented. The High Court may appoint an administrator under section 116 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 in special circumstances, including for the limited purpose of conducting the proceedings.

ZS applied under section 55A of the Family Law Act 1986 for a declaration that NJ, who died in 2019, was her father. DNA testing had been conducted on a blood sample held by an NHS Trust, but the resulting report described the testing as involving buccal samples. Other evidence concerning the alleged relationship, ZS’s birth certificate, NJ’s identity documents and possible nationality consequences was also incomplete.

The court also considered the proper parties. ZS’s mother had not been joined or served. JK had originally represented NJ’s estate under a grant made as attorney for NJ’s sister, but that sister had since died. The issues were whether the evidence justified a final declaration, who should represent the estate, and how the judgment should be published.

1. Parentage application. The ordinary civil standard, namely the balance of probabilities, applied. Although the DNA report stated a 99.9% probability of paternity, its description of the testing process was inconsistent with the evidence that NJ’s blood sample had been tested. The court could not be satisfied that the identity of the tested DNA, or the testing method, had been properly established. Material corroborative evidence was also absent. The application therefore could not presently succeed.
2. The substantive application was adjourned with liberty to restore it when further evidence had been obtained. The court indicated that the evidence should address the testing process and the missing documentary and factual evidence.
3. Parties. Under FPR 8.20, an application for a declaration of parentage should ordinarily include any person who is or is alleged to be the parent of the person whose parentage is in issue, unless that person is the applicant or a child. ZS’s mother was therefore to be joined and served.
4. Representation of the estate. JK could no longer act under the original grant after the death of the donor of his authority. Section 116 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 contains a general power to appoint an administrator where special circumstances make that necessary or expedient. In this case, the limited value of the estate, the absence of an obvious alternative representative and the limited purpose of the appointment justified reappointing JK as administrator for these proceedings. The grant was to be de bonis non and limited to representing the estate.
5. Publication. The court deferred final determination of the reporting restrictions issue. Although the hearing was private under FPR 27.10, publication was not automatically prohibited. The competing Article 8 and Article 10 interests required further evidence and consideration. Pending that determination, the judgment was to be published only in anonymised form.