Perotti v Watson & Ors

Permission to appeal depends on the proposed appeal having a real prospect of success or another compelling justification. A party’s desire for legal representation does not, by itself, satisfy that requirement. An appellate court will not interfere with a case-management discretion where the judge applied the correct principle and gave sustainable reasons.

The exceptional jurisdiction to reopen a perfected decision extends to the Court of Appeal and to the High Court when acting in an appellate capacity. It does not give the High Court a general power to reopen its first-instance orders. Permission for a second appeal requires an important point of principle or practice, or another compelling reason.

The applicant, a beneficiary under his late uncle’s will, had pursued extensive litigation arising from the administration of the estate. Eleven matters were before a single Lord Justice. They included applications for permission to appeal against refusals of adjournments, an extended civil restraint order, the appointment of an administrator, housing and costs decisions, the refusal of publicly funded transcripts and the refusal to reopen perfected first-instance orders.

The court also reviewed directions concerning the hearing of one application and considered whether a temporary stay preventing the sale of the applicant’s home should continue. The central questions were whether any proposed appeal had a real prospect of success, whether the statutory test for a second appeal was met, and whether any discretionary decision disclosed a proper ground for appellate intervention.

1. Disposition. All the applications were refused, including every application for permission to appeal. The directions under review were confirmed. A temporary stay of the sale of the applicant’s home was nevertheless continued until disposal of a forthcoming application concerning the professional-negligence proceedings, with liberty to apply.

2. The refusals to adjourn the civil-restraint proceedings involved discretionary case management. Blackburne J and Neuberger J had given proper reasons and had committed no error of principle. There was therefore no basis for appellate interference. The extended civil restraint order was also fully justified by the applicant’s history of persistent, misconceived and unreasonable litigation.

3. Section 116(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 required special circumstances before the discretion to appoint an administrator outside the ordinary order of entitlement arose. Such circumstances plainly existed. Park J was entitled to refuse to appoint a person subject to an extended civil restraint order and to appoint the estate’s principal creditor, who was the only person with a real economic interest in its remaining assets.

4. The proposed housing appeal was a second appeal. Section 55(1) of the Access to Justice Act 1999 and CPR 52.13 therefore required an important point of principle or practice or another compelling reason. A disagreement about the treatment of medical evidence met neither limb. An appeal under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996 was, in any event, confined to a point of law.

5. The power to provide an official transcript at public expense was discretionary. The applicant had not shown whether an official recording existed, whether cost was an excessive burden, or whether an advocate’s note had been requested and refused. The refusal of public funding was consequently unassailable.

6. The exceptional jurisdiction recognised in Taylor v Lawrence permits the Court of Appeal to reopen its appellate decisions. Seray-Wurie establishes a corresponding jurisdiction in the High Court when acting as an appellate court. Neither authority gives the High Court a general jurisdiction to reopen a perfected first-instance order. The proposed appeal from Rimer J’s refusal to reopen his 1997 orders was therefore misconceived.

7. The court warned that repeated appeals against refusals of permission under the extended restraint order could defeat its protective purpose. Further restraint would be considered at a later hearing. Pending that hearing, the Civil Appeals Office was directed not to accept further appellant’s notices from the applicant.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Refused all applications for permission to appeal, dismissed or confirmed the matters under review, and continued a temporary stay for a limited period. [2004] EWCA Civ 269.
• High Court and County Court: The challenged decisions included discretionary and procedural orders made by judges of the Chancery Division, Queen’s Bench Division and Family Division, and a homelessness appeal dismissed by the Central London County Court. Park J’s appointment of the estate administrator was reported as [2003] EWHC 2533 Chancery.
• Earlier administration proceedings: The applicant was substantially unsuccessful at trial in 1997, and his appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal in February 2001.