Perotti v City of Westminster

An appellant seeking permission to appeal must state clear grounds showing why the decision was wrong or unjust because of a serious procedural irregularity, and must comply with the applicable documentary requirements. A litigant cannot withhold those materials on the basis that a publicly funded transcript is needed first. The court may properly require grounds and the required appeal bundle before exercising its discretion whether to order a transcript at public expense.

Where an appeal is listed for dismissal for procedural non-compliance, the notice and order should identify that purpose and the requirement breached. This is especially important for litigants in person.

The appellant owned a flat for which Westminster initially treated him as liable for council tax after a tenant said he had left. Magistrates made two liability orders when the appellant did not attend. Westminster later removed the appellant’s liability and withdrew enforcement action after receiving material which it had previously failed to act upon.

The appellant nevertheless brought a High Court claim for aggravated or exemplary damages. Master Leslie struck out or summarily dismissed the claims, including claims under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and the Human Rights Act 1998. The appellant sought permission to appeal, but did not provide substantive grounds or the required bundle while insisting on a transcript at public expense. Cox J and subsequently Hughes J refused relief.

The central issues were whether the transcript should have been ordered before grounds were supplied, whether the High Court procedure was sufficiently clear, and whether any remittal for a merits appeal was justified.

1. Application dismissed. Brooke LJ, with whom Mance LJ agreed, held that Cox J had correctly declined to order a transcript of the Master’s judgment at public expense before the appellant identified his proposed grounds of appeal. Having heard the judgment, the appellant could explain why he said it was wrong or procedurally unfair without first obtaining a transcript.

2. Under CPR rule 52.2 and the Practice Direction to Part 52, the appellant was required to set out clearly why rule 52.11(3)(a) or (b) was engaged and to file the required bundle. Those materials would have enabled the High Court to understand the appeal and to decide whether a transcript should be provided at public expense. The appellant could also have used his own recording of the hearing or sought opposing counsel’s note of the judgment.

3. The court expressed concern that the order and subsequent notice did not transparently explain that the appeal was listed for dismissal because of procedural non-compliance. A lower appeal court’s refusal of permission on the merits cannot itself be appealed, but the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction where the complaint is that a procedural sanction should not have been imposed. The distinction makes clear notice particularly important for litigants in person.

4. There was nevertheless no real prospect of a successful appeal or of a remittal. Master Leslie had been justified in striking out and dismissing the pleaded claims. To the extent that the complaint concerned the council’s exercise of public-law functions, the appropriate remedy was a timely application to the Administrative Court. The alleged administrative failings did not render Westminster liable on the causes of action advanced.

5. By way of general practice guidance, a dismissal notice should explain its purpose, and an order dismissing an appeal for non-compliance should identify the rule, practice-direction requirement, or court order that was not met.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division). The appellant’s application was dismissed: [2005] EWCA Civ 581.

2. High Court, Queen’s Bench Division. Cox J required grounds of appeal before considering a publicly funded transcript. Hughes J later dismissed the application for permission to appeal after the appellant failed to provide arguable grounds.

3. High Court Master. Master Leslie struck out the claims concerning council-tax administration and liability orders, and gave summary judgment on the remaining claims.