Raja v Van Hoogstraten

Case-management orders, including an order directing a preliminary issue and refusing an adjournment, are matters for the trial judge’s discretion. The Court of Appeal will usually intervene only for an error of principle, injustice, or a decision outside the proper scope of that discretion. A litigant in person remains responsible for identifying and stating grounds of appeal. A party cannot use a later case-management application to revive an unappealed order, absent significant and serious changed circumstances. Repeated reliance on matters already decided, together with a failure to make timely arrangements for legal representation or funding, does not justify disturbing a fixed trial date.

The respondents represented the estate of Mohammed Raja in proceedings against Nicholas van Hoogstraten concerning allegations that he was responsible for Mr Raja’s death and separate fraud-related claims. Lightman J had ordered a preliminary trial on liability and had repeatedly refused applications intended to set aside or derail that order.

The appellant sought permission to appeal against the refusal to set aside the earlier order and against the refusal to adjourn the preliminary-issue trial. He relied, among other matters, on alleged new evidence concerning criminal convictions, disclosure issues, lack of funding, legal representation, and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The central issues were whether the challenges were out of time or abusive, and whether the case-management discretion had been wrongly exercised.

1. Applications dismissed. The challenge to the order directing the preliminary issue was, in substance, a very late attempt to appeal an order made on 26 January 2005. It had not been appealed in time, and no significant or serious change of circumstances justified reconsideration. The application was therefore out of time and misconceived.
2. Lightman J was entitled to treat the criminal convictions of Knapp and Croke as final for the civil proceedings, subject to Civil Evidence Act 1968, s 11. The appellant had not produced evidence capable of satisfying the civil burden that the convictions were wrongful. Any genuinely relevant late-disclosure issue could be dealt with separately on its merits.
3. Case-management decisions are discretionary. The Court of Appeal will not usually interfere unless there has been an error of principle or the order made is unjust. The January order was sensible and fair because it narrowed the issues, and the fraud issue did not justify postponing the preliminary issue.
4. The refusal to adjourn was also within the judge’s discretion. The appellant had been repeatedly told that he could seek modification of the freezing order to fund representation, but delayed doing so. The prejudice, cost and further delay to the respondents were substantial, while the preliminary issue was sufficiently confined for competent lawyers to prepare in time.
5. The Article 6 objection had no merit on the facts found. The applications were dismissed, with the appellant ordered to pay the respondents’ costs on an indemnity basis; £5,000 was to be paid on account, with the balance subject to detailed assessment.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): [2005] EWCA Civ 1483. Applications for permission to appeal and related challenges to Lightman J’s case-management orders were dismissed.
• High Court of Justice, Chancery Division: Lightman J directed a preliminary trial on liability on 26 January 2005, refused an application to discharge that order on 11 February 2005, and later refused applications to set it aside and to adjourn the trial.