Seray-Wurie v Hackney London Borough Council

The High Court, when sitting as an appellate court, has an inherent residual jurisdiction to reopen its final decisions to prevent real injustice in exceptional circumstances. The power is subject to the same strict limits as the corresponding jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal.

An applicant must clearly establish that a significant injustice has probably occurred and that no alternative effective remedy exists. The application should ordinarily be determined on paper under strong judicial control. Refusal on paper carries no right to an oral hearing.

A deputy costs judge set aside a default costs certificate for £280,063. Gibbs J refused permission to appeal, which would ordinarily have ended the matter under section 54(4) of the Access to Justice Act 1999. The claimant nevertheless applied to the High Court to reopen that refusal, relying on Taylor v Lawrence [2002] EWCA Civ 90.

Lloyd J refused the reopening application on paper but transferred the matter to the Court of Appeal so that it could determine whether the High Court, when acting as an appellate court, possessed a residual jurisdiction to reopen its final decisions and how such applications should be handled.

1. The appeal was dismissed unanimously. Brooke LJ delivered the judgment, with which Dyson and Simon Brown LJJ agreed. The High Court, when sitting as an appellate court, possesses an inherent residual jurisdiction to reopen its own final decisions to prevent real injustice in exceptional circumstances.

2. The logic underlying Taylor v Lawrence [2002] EWCA Civ 90 applied equally to the High Court. Like the Court of Appeal, the High Court has an inherent jurisdiction to do what is necessary to maintain its character as a court of justice. The restrictions governing the exercise of the power are precisely the same as those stated in Taylor.

3. The jurisdiction is subject to an extremely demanding threshold. It must be clearly established that a significant injustice has probably occurred and that no alternative effective remedy exists. The claimant merely disagreed with conclusions reached after the relevant points, including the significance of Godwin v Swindon Borough Council [2001] EWCA Civ 1478, had been argued. His case came nowhere near satisfying the threshold, and Lloyd J had correctly refused the application.

4. Future applications to reopen High Court appellate decisions should be made and considered on paper, following the procedure described in Taylor. Strong control is required because finality in litigation must be protected. If an application is refused on paper, the applicant has no right to an oral hearing. Whether applications should be referred to a High Court judge or master was left for the Civil Procedure Rules Committee.

5. The court found it unnecessary to decide whether Lloyd J had power under the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 to transfer the matter. The judgment did not address the reopening of appellate decisions made by circuit judges in the county court, where different considerations and procedural rules apply.

1. Court of Appeal: Held in [2002] EWCA Civ 909 that the High Court possessed the residual reopening jurisdiction, but unanimously dismissed the claimant's challenge because the stringent threshold was not met.
2. High Court, Lloyd J: Refused on paper the application to reopen Gibbs J's decision, then transferred the jurisdictional question and associated matter to the Court of Appeal.
3. High Court, Gibbs J: Refused permission to appeal from the deputy costs judge because no appeal had a realistic prospect of success.
4. Deputy Costs Judge Jefferson: Set aside the default costs certificate and directed the continuation of the detailed assessment proceedings.