Mex Group Worldwide Limited v Stewart Owen Ford & Ors

A person who knows of a court order must obey it unless and until it is set aside, even if the order is believed to be irregular, void or wrongly made. Legal advice, absence of wilful default and a pending set-aside application do not provide a defence to contempt, although they may be relevant to penalty.

Contempt must be proved to the criminal standard. The applicant must establish knowledge of the order, conduct amounting to breach, and knowledge of the facts making the conduct a breach. Alternative service on a Hague Convention state is permissible only in special or exceptional circumstances. A company officer may be personally liable where he deliberately causes the company’s breach, rather than merely because he is the person responsible for compliance.

The claimant sought committal orders against the third and eighth defendants for failing to comply with disclosure obligations in a worldwide freezing order. The order required disclosure of worldwide assets exceeding £10,000 and confirmation of that information by affidavit.

The defendants knew of the order but contended that service by email in Luxembourg was contrary to the Hague Convention and Luxembourg law. They also argued that the order was ineffective because it was allegedly irregular or void, and that the application should not proceed while a set-aside application remained pending.

The court determined whether the elements of contempt were established, whether alternative service was valid, whether service was illegal under Luxembourg law, and whether the third defendant was personally responsible for the eighth defendant’s breach.

1. Contempt established. The third and eighth defendants knew of the worldwide freezing order and its disclosure requirements. Neither provided the required asset information or affidavits. The breaches were proved to the criminal standard.
2. The relevant inquiry required proof of knowledge of the order, conduct involving breach, and knowledge of the facts making the conduct a breach. The claimant was not required to prove wilfulness. Legal advice or a mistaken belief that the order was unenforceable could affect mitigation but did not answer liability.
3. The obligation to obey an order is uncompromising. It continues unless and until the order is discharged or stayed, even where the affected person believes that the order is irregular, void or ought not to have been made. The pending application to set aside the freezing order therefore provided no defence.
4. Alternative service by email was permissible despite the Hague Convention. Service by an alternative method required special or exceptional circumstances. The risk that delay in service through the Luxembourg Central Authority would defeat the purpose of urgent freezing relief constituted such circumstances.
5. There was no evidential foundation for illegality under Luxembourg law. The evidence did not establish any Luxembourg provision equivalent to the Swiss criminal provision considered in The Sky One. The evidence of Elvinger Hoss Prussen was accepted, and service by email pursuant to the English court’s alternative-service order was neither illegal nor ineffective.
6. The third defendant was liable for the eighth defendant’s breach because, as manager and controlling shareholder, he deliberately caused the company not to provide the ordered disclosure. Liability was not imposed merely because he was the natural person responsible for ensuring compliance.
7. The first, second and fourth contempts were proved against the third defendant, and the first and second contempts against the eighth defendant. The third alleged ground was not a separate contempt. Consequential issues, including penalty, relief from sanctions and the relationship with the set-aside application, were adjourned.

The judgment records earlier adjournments before Ellenbogen J and Morris J, and a refusal by Soole J to stay the contempt application. This was the first-instance determination of liability on the committal application.