Pirtek (UK) Ltd v Jackson

On a committal application for contempt, the applicant must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent knew of the order, breached it, and knew the facts making the conduct a breach. Knowledge that the conduct amounted to contempt is unnecessary.

The court may proceed in the respondent’s absence where there has been strict procedural compliance and the respondent has had a fair and ample opportunity to participate, including an opportunity to obtain legal advice and legal aid. Hearsay and circumstantial evidence may be used, but an adverse inference from silence cannot be the sole basis for a finding of contempt.

An injunction restraining publication must be strictly construed. Whether a publication bears a prohibited meaning is assessed by the principles applicable in defamation proceedings.

Pirtek sought the committal of Robert Jackson for contempt of court. The application alleged that he had breached injunctions granted in earlier proceedings by continuing to publish statements about Pirtek which had been found to be defamatory or maliciously false.

Jackson did not attend and was not represented. The court considered whether the committal application could fairly proceed in his absence, whether the procedural requirements for committal had been met, and whether the evidence established the alleged breaches. The court also considered the proper approach to publications said to bear meanings prohibited by the injunction.

1. Proceeding in absence. The court was satisfied that the application and supporting evidence had been validly served by an authorised alternative method. Jackson knew of the proceedings, had received detailed notice of the allegations, and had repeatedly been informed of the availability of legal aid and the need to obtain legal advice. Applying Galloway v Ali Khan [2018] EWHC 780 (QB), Calderdale and Huddersfield NHS Foundation Trust v Atwal [2018] EWHC 961 (QB), and the principles derived from R v Jones [2003] 1 AC 1 (HL) and Sanchez v Oboz [2015] EWHC 235 (Fam), it was fair and appropriate to proceed.
2. Legal framework. The court adopted the principle in McCann v Bennett [2013] EWHC 283 (QB) that, where a party is self-represented or absent, the court must look for points that person may have missed. The applicant bore the burden of proving to the criminal standard that Jackson knew the terms of the injunction, acted in breach of it, and knew the facts which made his conduct a breach. Knowledge that the conduct constituted contempt was unnecessary.
3. Hearsay evidence was admissible. Circumstantial evidence could be assessed as in a criminal trial, and an adverse inference could be drawn from silence only where there was a case calling for an answer, it was fair to draw the inference, and the inference was not the sole basis for the finding.
4. The injunction had to be strictly construed. Applying the principles in Jeynes v News Magazines [2008] EWCA Civ 130 and Bukovsky v Crown Prosecution Service [2017] EWCA Civ 1529, the court assessed whether publications bore the prohibited meanings in their natural and ordinary meaning. It upheld specified complaints, declined to uphold complaints relying on a different limb of the injunction, and left other complaints undecided as disproportionate to determine.
5. The court found Jackson in contempt, but deferred penalty and gave him a final opportunity to participate in mitigation. The court noted the available sanctions and the possibility of ancillary orders under CPR 81.28(6).