Martyna Debicka v Regional Court in Gdansk (Poland)

In an extradition appeal based on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the appellate court must focus on whether the extradition decision was wrong in outcome. Errors or omissions in the reasoning do not necessarily justify intervention.

The public interest in extradition is constant and weighty. Extradition will ordinarily be disproportionate only where the interference with family life, including its effect on children, is exceptionally severe. A person’s young age at the time of offending is a significant factor against extradition, but is not decisive. Expert evidence must address the specific consequences relied upon and the appellate court need not improve an inadequately focused report.

The appellant appealed under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against an order for extradition made by a District Judge at Westminster Magistrates’ Court. Poland sought her extradition to serve custodial sentences for drug offences committed at 17 and burglary offences committed at 19.

The sole ground was that extradition would disproportionately interfere with the appellant’s and her young son’s private and family life. The appellant relied on fresh psychological and social-work evidence concerning her son’s likely reaction and the father’s ability to care for him. The central issues were whether the District Judge’s original decision was wrong and whether the fresh evidence satisfied the statutory conditions for allowing an appeal.

1. Appeal dismissed. The appellant did not establish either that the District Judge ought to have decided a question differently or that the fresh evidence would have required a different decision under sections 27(3) and 27(4) of the Extradition Act 2003.
2. The court applied the Celinski balance-sheet approach. The appellate question was whether the District Judge’s proportionality decision was wrong in outcome. Errors and omissions in the reasons did not themselves establish that the decision was wrong: Polish Judicial Authority v Celinski [2015] EWHC 1274 (Admin), [2016] 1 WLR 551.
3. Under H(H), the public interest in extradition is constant and weighty, although its weight varies with the seriousness of the offending. Extradition will ordinarily be disproportionate only where the consequences for family life are exceptionally severe: H(H) v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic [2012] UKSC 25, [2013] 1 AC 338. The son’s likely distress, behavioural difficulties, anxiety, disrupted routines and loss of face-to-face contact were serious but did not reach that threshold.
4. The District Judge was entitled to evaluate the expert report as presented. The absence of cross-examination did not require acceptance of its broad and generalised conclusions. The court was not required to conduct a fishing expedition or improve the appellant’s evidence. The fresh reports remained materially general, relied substantially on the appellant’s disputed account, and did not demonstrate exceptional severity.
5. The appellant’s age when offending was a significant factor against extradition. Nevertheless, she was a repeat offender who had breached a suspended sentence, and domestic sentencing standards indicated that immediate custody would probably have been imposed even at a young age. The age factor and the son’s welfare did not outweigh the public interest in extradition.
6. The appellant’s fugitive status reduced the weight of delay. Taking all matters in the round, extradition was proportionate and compatible with Article 8.

• Westminster Magistrates’ Court: The District Judge ordered extradition after a hearing on 10 November 2022 and gave reasons dated 26 November 2022.
• High Court (Administrative Court): Permission to appeal and permission to rely on fresh evidence were granted. The appeal was dismissed.