LXB v John Ridley

In a delayed personal injury claim arising from historic sexual assaults, the claimant must establish that it is equitable to disapply the primary limitation period. The court must assess all the circumstances, including the matters identified in Limitation Act 1980, section 33(3), and must balance the parties’ respective prejudice. Shame, fear, trauma, grooming, delayed disclosure, worsening symptoms and the effect of related criminal proceedings may provide reasonable explanations for delay. The statutory factors are not exhaustive. Where the evidence remains sufficiently cogent and the defendant cannot identify material forensic prejudice, the claim may proceed. Convictions for the underlying offences may materially strengthen the evidential position, although the civil court must still determine liability and causation on the civil standard.

LXB claimed damages from Mr John Ridley for two sexual assaults committed when LXB was aged between 12 and 16. The assaults occurred at or around a North London tennis club between approximately 2004 and 2008. The defendant had been convicted of two corresponding indecent assaults in the Crown Court, but denied liability in the civil proceedings.

The parties agreed that the issues were limitation, causation and quantum. The claim was issued in October 2022, well after expiry of the primary limitation period. The central questions were whether it was equitable to allow the claim to proceed under section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980, whether the assaults caused the claimant’s psychiatric injuries, and the appropriate damages.

1. Limitation. The claim was outside the primary limitation period. Applying section 33(3) of the Limitation Act 1980, and the approach identified in A v Hoare [2008] UKHL 6, the claimant established that it would be equitable for the claim to proceed. The relevant reasons for delay included shame, fear of disbelief, suppression of the events, manipulation through a contrived debt, the time required to disclose the abuse in therapy, worsening symptoms and self-medication through drugs and alcohol.
2. The claimant’s delay after disclosure was also reasonable. He was unaware of the possibility of civil compensation, reasonably awaited the conclusion of the criminal proceedings, and thereafter required time to obtain legal and medical advice. The defendant accepted that there was no real prejudice arising from the delay. The evidence remained sufficiently cogent for a fair trial, and the statutory factors were not exhaustive.
3. Liability. The defendant failed to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that he had not committed the offences for which he had been convicted. The court went further and found that the claimant had established that both assaults occurred as described. The claimant was a credible and consistent witness, and his account was supported by similar-fact evidence, the absence of collusion, his knowledge of the defendant’s house, and the defendant’s own lack of reliability.
4. Causation. The claimant proved that the assaults caused his complex post-traumatic stress disorder, depressive episodes and associated drug and alcohol misuse. The competing potential causes did not account for the psychiatric injury. Both experts accepted that the injuries were attributable to the assaults on the balance of probabilities.
5. Quantum. The court assessed damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenity at £70,000, including the assaults, prolonged psychiatric injury and aggravating features arising from the defendant’s continuing denial.