Colliss Kasasa Mugabe v The Home Office

When deciding whether to extend or disapply a limitation period, the court must assess all the circumstances and conduct a fair evaluation of the statutory factors. A claimant’s earlier disadvantage, illness or efforts to obtain advice may explain an initial delay, but a prolonged period after the claimant is mentally fit, informed of the claim and able to litigate will weigh heavily against an extension. Prejudice caused by lost evidence is also material. The court may apply the same considerations when exercising the discretion under section 7(5)(b) of the Human Rights Act 1998. Sympathy for the claimant or the seriousness of the allegations does not displace the need to enforce limitation periods fairly.

The claimant brought claims against the Home Office arising from an incorrect statement in a 2007 asylum refusal letter concerning the identity of the mother of his child. He alleged misfeasance in public office, negligent misstatement, breach of the Data Protection Act 1998 and breach of article 8 of the ECHR.

The claims were issued in 2023, although the claimant accepted that they accrued in 2007. The trial concerned a preliminary limitation issue. The central question was whether it would be equitable to disapply the three-year limitation period under section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980, or to extend the one-year period under section 7(5)(b) of the Human Rights Act 1998.

1. Disposition. The applications under section 33(1) of the Limitation Act 1980 and section 7(5)(b) of the Human Rights Act 1998 were dismissed. The claims were time-barred and dismissed.
2. The claims for misfeasance in public office, negligent misstatement and breach of the Data Protection Act 1998 fell within section 11 of the Limitation Act 1980. On the claimant’s own evidence, he knew from the outset that his psychological injury was significant and attributable to the Home Office. Time therefore ran from 2007, subject to the section 33 discretion.
3. Section 33 required consideration of all the circumstances, including the length and reasons for delay, evidential cogency, the defendant’s conduct, disability, the claimant’s promptness after knowledge, and steps taken to obtain advice. The claimant’s lack of immigration status, limited access to information and legal assistance, uncertainty about the Home Office’s fault, and mental health difficulties adequately explained the delay until the end of 2014.
4. After 2014, however, the claimant was mentally fit, understood that his claims were out of time, knew that an extension was necessary, and was able to issue proceedings as a litigant in person. His further delay until 2023 was not satisfactorily explained. The disappearance of relevant Home Office personnel and investigation records created likely prejudice in defending the claims.
5. The same statutory circumstances were relevant to the discretion under section 7(5)(b) of the Human Rights Act 1998. The substantial delay, inadequate explanation after 2014 and evidential prejudice meant that extending time was not equitable. The seriousness of the claimant’s allegations and his understandable indignation did not justify a different result.