Patience Idara v London Borough of Southwark

Under section 204(2A)(b) of the Housing Act 1996, an applicant must establish a good reason both for failing to bring the appeal within 21 days and for any subsequent delay in applying for permission. The second inquiry concerns the period from expiry of the 21-day limit until the permission application, assessed as a whole. The same circumstances may explain both delays, but the first good reason does not automatically establish the second. The statutory test is distinct from the Mitchell/Denton approach to relief from sanctions. Once the good-reason gateway is satisfied, the court retains a discretion whether to permit the late appeal.

The appellant challenged a review decision under section 202 of the Housing Act 1996 concerning the suitability of accommodation offered by the respondent. The review decision was notified on 23 March 2023, but the section 204 appeal was filed after the 21-day period. HHJ Hellman accepted that the appellant had a good reason for not appealing in time because she was seeking legal assistance, but found no good reason for the subsequent delay caused by administrative shortcomings within her solicitors’ firm. He refused permission to appeal out of time.

The issue was whether section 204(2A)(b) required a separate good reason for the whole period of delay in applying for permission.

1. Appeal dismissed. The appellant failed to establish a good reason for the delay in applying for permission, so the statutory gateway was not met and the discretion to permit a late appeal did not arise.
2. Section 204(2A)(b) requires two inquiries: whether there was a good reason for failing to bring the appeal within the 21-day period under section 204(2), and whether there was a good reason for any delay in applying for permission after that period. The latter inquiry concerns the period from expiry of the 21 days until the application is made, whenever that occurs.
3. The same factual circumstances may provide a good reason for both limbs, but they need not do so. It was therefore open to HHJ Hellman to find that the appellant’s inability to secure a solicitor explained the late appeal, while the solicitors’ subsequent administrative failure did not explain the later delay in applying for permission.
4. The word “delay” in section 204(2A)(b) must be understood against section 204(2A)(a), which addresses an application made within the 21-day period. The ordinary meaning of the statutory language required no additional words. The legislative context, including the need for expedition in homelessness cases, supported that construction.
5. The finding that the solicitors’ administrative shortcomings did not constitute a good reason was a factual finding and a value judgment under the statutory test. Applying Peake v Hackney LBC, it could be disturbed on appeal only if it was wrong. It was not wrong.
6. The decision in Tower Hamlets LBC v Al Ahmed did not determine that only one good reason was required, because that case concerned a period of delay which was explained as a whole. Its reasoning did not support the appellant’s construction.
7. Passing the statutory gateway would not require permission to be granted. The court would retain a discretion to consider other relevant matters, including material changes in circumstances and the position of the local authority.

• High Court (King’s Bench Division): appeal dismissed from HHJ Hellman’s order dated 9 October 2023 refusing permission to appeal out of time and striking out the appeal.