Victoria Stumbre v Prosecutor General’s Office of the Republic of Lithuania

On an appeal concerning proportionality under article 8, the appellate court should not interfere merely because it entertains doubts about the first-instance conclusion. The appeal must be dismissed where the conclusion is one that, after anxious consideration, the appellate court considers correct.

In extradition cases, the public interest in honouring extradition arrangements is particularly strong where the alleged offending is serious, extensive and admitted, and where the requested person is a fugitive. That interest may justify very severe interference with the article 8 rights of dependent children. The children’s best interests must receive substantial weight, but may be displaced by countervailing reasons of considerable force. Such cases will be rare.

This was an appeal against an extradition order made by District Judge Bristow on 21 September 2022. The order concerned an accusation warrant issued by the Prosecutor General of Lithuania in respect of 36 alleged offences, including fraud and forgery.

The appellant had previously been extradited to Lithuania on an earlier warrant, released on conditional bail, and then returned to the United Kingdom in breach of conditions requiring her to remain in Lithuania. The central issue was whether extradition under the second warrant would be a disproportionate interference with the appellant’s and her three younger children’s rights under article 8. The children were likely to enter foster care and might be separated.

1. Appeal dismissed. The District Judge’s conclusion that extradition would be a proportionate interference with article 8 rights was not wrong.
2. The appellate approach to a proportionality assessment is that the court must consider the judgment in the round and avoid unrealistic over-analysis. Applying the framework stated in Re B, an appeal must be dismissed where the appellate judge has doubts but, after anxious consideration, remains satisfied that the first-instance conclusion was correct. The present case fell within that category.
3. The District Judge had properly accepted the clinical evidence that extradition would have very serious consequences for the children, including likely foster care and possible separation. His reference to foster care, medical support and continuing contact with relatives did not contradict or materially diminish that evidence.
4. The possibility of prosecution in England had not been overlooked. It had been considered in the forum-bar analysis under sections 11(1)(j) and 19B of the Extradition Act 2003. The forum and article 8 issues overlapped, so it was unnecessary to repeat the same family-life evidence in the article 8 section.
5. Following the approach in HH, the public interest in fulfilling extradition obligations may, in a very rare case, outweigh even severe interference with dependent children’s rights. Here, the alleged offending was serious and extensive, the appellant admitted guilt in respect of 21 allegations, and she had absconded after the earlier extradition and dishonestly obtained a passport to facilitate her departure. Those matters gave the public interest exceptional weight.
6. The children’s best interests were a paramount consideration and were given significant weight. They were not to be blamed for the appellant’s conduct. Nevertheless, the countervailing reasons were of sufficient force to displace those interests. The extradition order therefore stood.

• High Court (Administrative Court): appeal against the extradition order dismissed.
• District Judge Bristow: extradition order made on 21 September 2022.