Stephen Pincus v Sandeep Singh Johal & Anor

A reversioner may sue in nuisance for permanent or potentially permanent damage to a proprietary interest, including interference with an easement, even though the land is let to a tenant. Actionable interference with a right of way requires substantial interference with its reasonable use. The grantee may reasonably insist on retaining the whole of the facility granted where that preference is neither unreasonable nor perverse.

For default judgment obtained by request, a claimant who expressly abandons all non-monetary relief cannot later pursue final mandatory or prohibitory injunctions merely because an interim injunction was previously granted. CPR rule 3.10 does not ordinarily correct a deliberate procedural choice characterised only as an internal error of language.

The claimant owned commercial premises adjoining land owned by the second defendant. His land was let to a tenant, and access to the premises was obtained over a concrete platform and ramp partly situated on the defendants’ land.

The defendants had damaged and partly reinstated the platform. The claimant sought permission to enter the defendants’ land to restore it. Default judgments had previously been entered after the claimant’s solicitors stated that he was content not to pursue all non-monetary aspects of the claim. The claimant argued that this referred only to declaratory relief and did not abandon the final injunctions.

The issues were standing, interference with the right of way, abandonment, and whether the court should grant or regularise the injunction claim.

1. Standing. The claim was in nuisance, not trespass. A claimant need not be in possession to sue for damage to a proprietary interest. A reversioner may sue where the nuisance is permanent, or may continue until the reversion falls into possession. The claimant therefore had standing without joining his tenant.
2. Interference. An easement owner may sue for interference with the easement, and actual damage need not be proved. The relevant question was whether there was substantial interference with the reasonable use of the right of way. The claimant was entitled to insist on the whole width of the platform where that preference was reasonable. The defective reconstruction, including a protruding manhole cover that created an obstacle and trip hazard, amounted to substantial interference.
3. Abandonment. CPR rule 12.4 permits judgment by request only where the claim is confined to specified remedies. The accompanying letter stating that the claimant would not pursue all non-monetary aspects of the claim had to be read objectively and in context. It abandoned the outstanding final mandatory and prohibitory injunctions. The earlier interim injunction did not constitute final relief and did not survive that abandonment as an independently enforceable final claim.
4. Authority and correction. Robins v Kordowski was distinguishable because it concerned the procedural use of a request for default judgment without an express abandonment of non-monetary relief. CPR rule 13.6 indicated the circumstances in which abandoned relief was restored. CPR rule 3.10 did not apply because the claimant deliberately chose the request procedure; the solicitor’s mistake was an error of language, not an error of procedure. Nor did the unexplained internal mistake justify setting aside the relevant orders under CPR rule 3.1(7).
5. The injunction claim was abandoned. The claimant was restricted to damages, which required an inquiry before the master. The claimant’s application was dismissed.

This was a first-instance application. The judgment records earlier interim injunction proceedings before Miles J and default judgments entered against the defendants. The defendants’ application to set aside those default judgments had previously been dismissed in [2023] EWHC 2997 (Ch); no permission to appeal was sought and no appeal was known to have been lodged.