Keith Courtney v Richard Ronksley

For a libel claim based on publication to a limited class of identified readers, the serious harm threshold under Defamation Act 2013, section 1(1), ordinarily requires evidence from the readers, or objective evidence capable of supporting an inference, that the claimant’s reputation was seriously harmed in their minds. The claimant’s own distress, the defamatory tendency of the words, and adverse action taken for an independent reason do not establish serious harm. A claim should not proceed to trial on the speculative hope that disclosure or cross-examination may produce missing evidence. Summary judgment is appropriate where the available evidence is clear, unambiguous and positively contrary to serious reputational harm.

Mr Keith Courtney brought a libel claim against Mr Richard Ronksley concerning a letter circulated to a limited group of educational and local-government recipients. The letter raised concerns about safeguarding and health and safety at premises operated by a charitable trust of which Mr Courtney was a trustee, and stated that the defendant no longer had confidence in the safety of pupils using the premises.

The defendant applied for summary judgment under Civil Procedure Rules 1998, rule 24.3, alternatively seeking strike-out. The central issue was whether the claimant had a real prospect of proving that publication had caused or was likely to cause serious harm to his reputation.

1. Application granted. The defendant obtained summary judgment on the libel claim. There was no compelling reason for the claim to proceed to trial.
2. Under section 1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013, serious harm is concerned with the real-life effect of publication on the reputation of the claimant in the minds of third-party readers. It is a question of fact requiring evidence of impact and causation, rather than an inference based solely on the words’ inherent defamatory tendency.
3. Although adverse action by a publishee may be evidence of a change in opinion, it is not itself the harm required by section 1(1). Conversely, professional investigation of allegations does not show that the investigator thought worse of the claimant, particularly where the investigation results favourably in the claimant’s interests.
4. This was not a mass-publication case. The original publishees were identifiable individuals. The claimant had produced no witness evidence from any publishee showing serious reputational harm, and the available evidence showed that the principal recipients had not changed their opinions of him. There was also no evidential basis for significant onward republication.
5. The court could consider the evidence available on the application and evidence reasonably expected at trial, but the summary judgment jurisdiction did not permit a case to continue merely because something might emerge through disclosure or cross-examination. General observations about the fallibility of memory did not provide a specific evidential basis for expecting materially different evidence.
6. The claimant’s personal distress and belief that the letter was unfair were immaterial to the statutory question. The earlier decision to withdraw pupils could not have been caused by the later publication, and the consequences of that withdrawal were outside the scope of the libel claim.
7. The court noted, without deciding, possible issues concerning qualified privilege and malice. Those matters did not affect the summary judgment decision.