Arkadiusz Rozwens v Circuit Court in Lodz, Poland

An appellate court reviewing an extradition decision must determine whether the lower judge ought to have answered a statutory question differently and, if so, whether discharge would have been required. It must respect factual findings and avoid substituting its own overall view.

Under Extradition Act 2003, delay is oppressive only where the resulting hardship, viewed in all the circumstances, makes extradition unjust or oppressive. Domestic sentencing guidelines may provide a useful cross-check on seriousness and likely penalty, but they do not require a detailed mini-sentencing exercise for an offence to be tried abroad. The statutory proportionality assessment remains fact-specific and must address only the specified matters.

The appellant appealed against a District Judge’s order dated 16 January 2023 directing his extradition to Poland under an accusation European Arrest Warrant. The warrant concerned an alleged 2005 burglary of a mobile-phone shop, in which the appellant was said to have acted as lookout.

He challenged the order on three grounds: oppression arising from the passage of time under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003; incompatibility with Article 8 of the Convention under section 21A(1)(a); and disproportionality under section 21A(1)(b). The central issues were whether the District Judge had made a material legal or evaluative error, and whether the appellant should consequently have been discharged.

1. Appeal dismissed. Under section 27(3) of the Extradition Act 2003, the court could allow the appeal only if the District Judge ought to have decided a question differently and, on the correct decision, would have been required to order discharge. The appeal involved review rather than a fresh determination. Findings of fact, particularly findings based on oral evidence, were ordinarily to be respected.
2. For section 14, oppression concerned hardship to the accused resulting from changes in circumstances during the relevant period. Even culpable or unexplained delay did not automatically make extradition oppressive. The District Judge had carefully analysed the chronology and was entitled to conclude that the delay was not culpable. The appellant’s limited ties to the United Kingdom and absence of dependants also supported the conclusion that extradition was not oppressive.
3. The District Judge had properly applied the Celinski balance-sheet approach to Article 8. The appellate court was not entitled to conduct a fresh proportionality assessment merely because it might have reached a different view. No material error had been shown.
4. Domestic Sentencing Guidelines could be a useful cross-check when assessing seriousness or likely penalty, as explained in Smulczyk. They did not impose a rigid requirement to conduct a detailed sentencing exercise for an offence to be tried and sentenced in the requesting state. The domestic court must not impose its own view of the appropriate foreign sentence or undermine mutual trust in extradition arrangements.
5. Section 21A(2)–(3) required consideration only of the specified proportionality matters: the seriousness of the alleged conduct, the likely penalty, and the possibility of less coercive measures. The burglary was a serious group offence involving criminal damage and personal gain. The District Judge was entitled to find a serious possibility of immediate custody. Burglary was expressly excluded from the categories in the Criminal Practice Directions where extradition was generally disproportionate. No less coercive alternative was identified.
6. There was no basis to interfere with any of the District Judge’s conclusions. Grounds 1, 2 and 3 therefore failed.

1. High Court (Administrative Court) — appeal dismissed against the District Judge’s extradition order dated 16 January 2023.
2. Westminster Magistrates’ Court — extradition hearing held on 6 December 2022; extradition ordered to Poland.