Frank Sinton v Maybourne Hotels Limited & Ors

On a summary judgment application, the court asks whether the claim has a realistic prospect of success, without conducting a mini-trial. The claimant must identify evidence capable of supporting the claim at trial; speculation that something may emerge on disclosure is insufficient.

Publication of information necessary to suspend access to work sites may attract qualified privilege where the recipients have a corresponding business or operational interest. That privilege may extend to necessary republication unless republication beyond the privileged purpose was intended or directed. Malice requires proof, against each relevant defendant, of knowledge of falsity, recklessness as to truth, or a dominant intention to injure. Serious harm under section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013 remained a triable issue, but the claims failed because malice had no real evidential basis.

Frank Sinton brought claims in libel, malicious falsehood and breach of data protection law against Maybourne Hotels Limited and four individuals. The libel and malicious falsehood claims concerned communications made after the defendants suspended his access to hotel construction sites pending an investigation into alleged misconduct.

The defendants sought summary judgment under CPR 24.2 and 24.3, alternatively strike-out under CPR 3.4(2)(a) and (b). The central issues were publication, serious harm, qualified privilege, malice, the viability of the malicious falsehood claim and abuse of process. The data protection claim was not finally determined.

1. Summary judgment principles. The court applied the realistic-prospect test. It could evaluate the evidence and draw a line where the claimant had no proper evidential basis, but could not conduct a mini-trial. A claimant relying on future evidence had to identify its nature, source and relevance.
2. Publication. The claimant had a real prospect of proving that publication to HSMC authorised republication to persons who needed to know of the suspension. The alleged publications to Mr de Boissieu and Mr Bouquay had no secure evidential basis and had no real prospect of being established.
3. Serious harm. The claimant had a real prospect of showing that the original publication or authorised republications caused serious reputational harm. Evidence that barring a senior individual from several sites was unusual and caused doubts about his reputation meant that this issue should be left for trial. The court also noted that damage arising through republication by others was arguably relevant.
4. Qualified privilege. The publications that could be proved were made on occasions of qualified privilege. The letter was sent confidentially to a small group with pre-existing business relationships and corresponding interests in knowing about the suspension. Communication of the alleged defamatory meaning was necessary to explain and implement the suspension. The privilege extended to republication required to enforce and police the ban, absent an intention to exceed the privileged purpose.
5. Malice. The claimant had no real prospect of proving that any defendant knew the statements were false, was reckless as to their truth, or acted with a dominant intention to injure him. The evidence of allegations made to Mr Socker, supported independently by the investigation report, pointed one way. The pleaded inferences based on procedural deficiencies, later solicitor correspondence, the commercial dispute and timing were insufficient. Malice had to be established individually against each defendant.
6. Disposition. Summary judgment was granted to the defendants on the defamation and malicious falsehood claims. The abuse-of-process issue was not determined in detail. Further submissions were invited concerning directions for the data protection claim, including possible transfer to the county court.