Sharon Kofa, R (on the application of) v Oldham Metropolitan Bolton Council

A judicial review claim challenging a county court charging order will ordinarily be refused where the claimant had an adequate statutory remedy, including an appeal or an application to discharge or vary the order. That discretionary bar applies even where the proposed challenge concerns a statutory precondition to the charging order. Council tax legislation does not depend on an individual’s personal consent. Arguments based on democratic consent, the rule of law or the absence of an impact assessment do not make primary legislation inapplicable to an individual dwelling without an identified superior legal requirement. Questions about whether magistrates made liability orders should ordinarily be raised before the county court or on appeal, rather than reserved for judicial review.

The claimant challenged an October 2023 county court charging order securing unpaid council tax and associated costs. The charging order referred to liability orders allegedly made by a magistrates’ court in 2021 and 2022.

She argued that no enforceable liability existed because no court-issued liability orders, or official entries in the magistrates’ court record, had been produced. She also advanced constitutional arguments based on individual consent, the rule of law and the absence of an impact assessment.

The application was a renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review. The central questions were whether the claim was arguable with a realistic prospect of success and whether an alternative-remedy discretionary bar applied.

1. Permission refused. The claim targeted a charging order made by the Manchester County Court, not conduct of the Council alone. The County Court should have been joined as a defendant, although permission was refused on the alternative-remedy ground.
2. The constitutional arguments were not realistically arguable. The Local Government Finance Act 1992 imposes council tax obligations in relation to chargeable dwellings. Individual consent is not required. Ashby v White concerned democratic consent through elected representatives, rather than personal consent to each statute. No superior legal source requiring an impact assessment was identified, and no viable property-rights or systemic public-law challenge was shown.
3. Under regulation 50(1) of the Council Tax (Administration and Enforcement) Regulations 1992, the county court must be satisfied that a magistrates’ court has made one or more liability orders before making a charging order. The claimant could have raised her arguments about the alleged absence of court-issued orders or court-record evidence at the October 2023 hearing or by appeal.
4. The claimant also had an available remedy under regulation 51(4), allowing the court that made the charging order, at any time, to discharge or vary it. That route remained available on the material before the court. Judicial review was therefore inappropriate because the claimant had failed to use an adequate statutory remedy. It would be contrary to the interests of justice and the public interest to reserve such points for a later judicial review.
5. The judge made observations, without deciding the liability-order arguments, that the Regulations did not require a court-issued order or production of a court-register entry. Evidence from a person present in the magistrates’ court might suffice, depending on the circumstances. The claimant was ordered to pay £3,250 for the acknowledgment of service and summary grounds. There was no order as to the costs of the hearing.

First-instance renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review. Permission was refused by the High Court (Administrative Court).