Peacekeepers Foundation, R (on the application of) v Liverpool and Knowsley Magistrates Court

Permission to apply for judicial review requires an arguable ground with a realistic prospect of success, subject also to sufficient interest and the statutory and procedural bars. Judicial discretion concerning remote observation of court proceedings must respect open justice, but access is not absolute. The court may take account of the timing and administrative impact of late or numerous applications. A challenge to council tax liability is generally for the Valuation Tribunal, but judicial review remains available for public law challenges to the conduct and reasoning of magistrates. Statutory schemes may authorise delegated judicial functions where Parliament has provided clear authority. A summons or liability order need not take a particular written form where the statutory and court-register procedures provide a fair and sufficiently open process.

The claimant sought permission for judicial review arising from council tax liability proceedings brought by Liverpool City Council against Mr Horn in the Liverpool and Knowsley Magistrates’ Court. A District Judge made a liability order, refused an application to state a case, and gave written reasons.

Permission had been refused on the papers. The renewed application challenged restrictions on physical and remote public access, refusal of permission to record the hearing, council tax notices, delegated issue of the summons, the costs awarded, the adequacy of the District Judge’s reasons, the form and recording of the liability order, and the constitutional validity of council tax legislation.

1. Permission refused. None of the remaining grounds was arguable. Grounds 4–9 were certified as totally without merit.
2. The renewed judge had to reconsider permission afresh. The test was whether there was an arguable ground with a realistic prospect of success. The court also considered sufficient interest, delay and alternative remedies.
3. Remote observation involved judicial discretion under section 85A of the Courts Act 2003 and regulations 3–5 of the Remote Observation and Recording (Courts and Tribunals) Regulations 2022. Open justice was mandatory, but not absolute. The District Judge was entitled to consider each application, require identification, and give substantial weight to the timing and administrative consequences of about 70 late applications. The decision was not irrational.
4. Refusal of permission to record the hearing was also not arguably irrational. Section 9 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 gives the court a discretion, and the risk of unlawful publication, together with the availability of a written judgment and note-taking, provided relevant reasons. Whether legislative change was desirable was a matter for Parliament.
5. Under regulation 57 of the Council Tax (Administration and Enforcement) Regulations 1992 and section 16 of the Local Government Finance Act 1992, liability questions generally belong before the Valuation Tribunal. The present complaints concerned the legality, conduct and reasoning of the magistrates’ process, so an alternative-remedy bar was not established.
6. The statutory schemes authorising court officers to issue summonses were lawful. The Courts Act 2003 and the Magistrates’ Court (Functions of Authorised Persons—Civil Proceedings) Rules 2020 supplied clear authority. The absence of a signature did not invalidate the summons.
7. The District Judge applied the principle in Nicholson. He rejected unexplained costs but allowed counsel’s costs after finding them reasonably incurred. The register and certified-extract procedures, together with the public making of the order, provided a fair and open process. The constitutional arguments based on Ashby were untenable, following Kofa.
8. The claimant must pay LCC’s costs of its acknowledgment of service and summary grounds, summarily assessed at £2,412, within 14 days. LCC withdrew its claim for hearing costs.

Permission had been refused on the papers by Mr Mark Ockelton, sitting as a High Court judge, by an order sealed on 3 March 2025.

High Court (Administrative Court): renewed application for permission refused; Grounds 4–9 certified totally without merit. Costs ordered as stated in the judgment.