Mohammed Mashuk Miah v Doctor Hayley Jones & Anor

[2024] EWHC 92 (KB)

Case details

Case citations
[2024] EWHC 92 (KB)
Court
High Court (King's Bench Division)
Judgment date
30 January 2024
Judgment text

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Subjects
Tort Negligence Road traffic accidents
Keywords
driver negligence pedestrian collision standard of the reasonably prudent driver Highway Code bus passenger foreseeability accident reconstruction evidence coincidence of location fallacy
Outcome
claim dismissed
Judicial consideration

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Summary

A driver is not negligent merely because an accident occurs while driving below the speed limit at night. The question is whether a reasonably prudent driver, considering the actual circumstances, should have recognised a real risk and taken reasonable precautions. A mere possibility that an adult passenger may cross from behind a bus does not require a driver to slow to a speed allowing an immediate stop, particularly where the bus is not at a recognised bus stop, the passenger is wearing dark clothing and the driver could not reasonably infer that the passenger had alighted. Expert calculations must not be converted into a mathematically precise framework for judging the driver’s conduct. The claim was dismissed.

Factual background

The claimant, a pedestrian and protected party, was struck by a car while crossing a dark rural road after alighting from a bus stopped opposite a restaurant. He alleged that the defendant driver had driven too fast, failed to anticipate that a passenger might cross from behind the bus, failed to brake and failed to use full-beam headlights.

The parties relied on lay evidence and accident reconstruction evidence, including CCTV footage from the bus. The experts agreed that, at the defendant’s speed, she could not identify the claimant in time to brake before impact. The central issues were whether the defendant should have recognised the bus and inferred that a passenger had alighted, whether she should have reduced speed or changed headlights, and whether any breach caused the collision.

Held

  1. Duty and standard. The claimant bore the burden of proving, on the balance of probabilities, that the defendant failed to act as a reasonably competent and prudent driver and that the breach caused the accident.
  2. Speed and visibility. Driving at about 55–58 mph, below the applicable 60 mph limit, was not negligent on this straight rural road. It was dark and unlit, but visibility was otherwise good and the road was suitable for the national speed limit. The defendant could not reasonably be expected to identify a stationary bus about 370–390 metres away, or to see the claimant alight while wearing predominantly dark clothing.
  3. Bus and foreseeable risk. At approximately 150 metres the defendant could recognise the oncoming vehicle as a bus. However, the indicators had been extinguished, glare affected visibility, and the defendant had no sufficient reason to infer that the bus had stopped to drop off a passenger opposite a location that was not a bus stop. The risk of an adult pedestrian striding into the road without looking was a mere possibility, not a real risk requiring a substantial reduction in speed.
  4. Headlights and causation. It was not negligent to leave the headlights dipped after passing the bus. The defendant was unlikely to identify the claimant in the approximately two seconds before impact, and both experts agreed that braking then would have been too late. The court therefore rejected breach and causation on the pleaded bases.
  5. The court did not need to determine conclusively the expert evidence on “avoidance potential”. If a later breach had been established, the calculations might have engaged the coincidence of location fallacy and contained too many imponderables for reliable findings. The claim was dismissed.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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