Zachary De Silva v Licensing Authority of Trinidad and Tobago and another (Trinidad and Tobago)

The forum for an appeal against a driving disqualification imposed by the Licensing Authority under section 88M(9) of the Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Act must be determined in its statutory and historical context. A reference to a “Court of competent jurisdiction” does not, without more, confer appellate jurisdiction on the High Court. The pre-existing allocation of traffic appeals, the finality of the decision, and the need for a coherent appellate route supported the conclusion that the appropriate forum was the Court of Appeal.

The appellant accumulated 10 demerit points after paying three fixed penalties. The Licensing Authority notified him that he would be disqualified from holding a driving permit for six months under section 88M of the Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Act, and then made the disqualification decision.

He filed an appeal in the High Court, seeking to challenge the suspension as unreasonable and disproportionate. Seepersad J held that the appeal belonged in the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal affirmed that conclusion. The central issue before the Board was whether section 88M(9), which permits an appeal to a “Court of competent jurisdiction” and makes that court’s decision final, conferred jurisdiction on the High Court or the Court of Appeal.

The appeal was dismissed. The Court of Appeal was the correct forum for an appeal under section 88M(9) of the Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Act.

1. The only statutory definition potentially applicable to “Court” was section 80, which adopted the meaning assigned by the Summary Courts Act. The summary court was not the correct forum, leaving a choice between the High Court and the Court of Appeal.

2. The expression “Court of competent jurisdiction” was apt to refer back to the existing appellate regime. Before the 2017 amendments, disqualification orders made by the Magistrates’ Court were appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Amending Act introduced a new administrative demerit-points regime but contained no clear indication that it intended a fundamental change to the allocation of appellate responsibilities. The continued use of the same phrase in the earlier section 86B supported that conclusion.

3. The express provision that the decision of the court on an appeal under section 88M(9) was final was an important indication that the designated court was the Court of Appeal. The Board did not regard the provisions of the Co-operative Societies Act or the Pharmacy Board Act as close comparisons.

4. The Court of Appeal was also the appellate forum for other traffic disqualification decisions. A single appellate route avoided inconsistency and enabled that court to develop authoritative guidance for the Licensing Authority and Magistrates. The different wording of section 88H did not outweigh the stronger statutory and historical context.

5. The High Court’s inherent jurisdiction did not include an inherent appellate jurisdiction. In an unusual case requiring oral evidence, the Court of Appeal had sufficient powers under Part 64 of the Civil Proceedings Rules. The question whether the appellant could still pursue the substance of his appeal was left to the Court of Appeal.

1. Privy Council: [2024] UKPC 17 dismissed the appeal.
2. Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago: affirmed the High Court’s conclusion that an appeal under section 88M(9) of the Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Act lay to the Court of Appeal (12 August 2021).
3. High Court: held that the appeal belonged in the Court of Appeal rather than the High Court (9 February 2021).