Secretary of State for the Home Department v Betim Onuzi

In assessing deprivation of citizenship for fraud, false representation or concealment of a material fact, the Secretary of State must consider the statutory good-character requirement for naturalisation. Dishonestly concealed conduct which might cast doubt on good character is generally capable of being material, even where an earlier grant of leave was discretionary or arose from administrative error. A broken chain of causation is principally relevant where the applicant made full disclosure and the Secretary of State nevertheless granted leave or citizenship with knowledge of the facts. Sleiman should be read narrowly and in the context of the statutory scheme. The Tribunal must also assess the public interest in deprivation when considering Article 8.

The Secretary of State deprived the respondent of British citizenship under section 40(3) of the British Nationality Act 1981 after discovering that he had made an asylum claim in a false identity and had continued to conceal that fact when obtaining indefinite leave to remain and naturalisation.

The First-tier Tribunal allowed his appeal, finding that the deception was not material because indefinite leave had principally resulted from delay and maladministration, and also allowing the appeal on Article 8 grounds. The Upper Tribunal set that decision aside for error of law and directed a resumed hearing. On remaking the decision, the issue was whether the deception was material to the acquisition of citizenship and whether deprivation was incompatible with the respondent’s private and family life.

1. Error of law. The First-tier Tribunal had misapplied Sleiman by treating the earlier grant of indefinite leave as breaking the causal chain without asking whether the respondent’s undisclosed conduct might have affected the good-character assessment required by section 6(1) and Schedule 1 to the British Nationality Act 1981. Its Article 8 assessment also failed to weigh the public interest in deprivation. The decision was set aside.
2. Applicable principles. Good character has no statutory definition. Subject to administrative-law principles, the Secretary of State has the starting responsibility for deciding whether the applicant satisfies that requirement. Under section 40(3), the relevant questions are whether the Secretary of State is satisfied that the condition precedent is met, whether naturalisation was obtained by means of the relevant conduct, and whether that conduct involved fraud, false representation or concealment of a material fact.
3. Negative behaviour which might cast doubt on good character is likely to be directly material, whether it occurred in the naturalisation application or earlier. In most cases, an earlier grant of leave made without knowledge of the concealed facts will not break causation. The omission of facts potentially relevant to good character in the naturalisation application is likely to constitute concealment material to obtaining citizenship.
4. The respondent had maintained a false identity and false asylum narrative throughout his residence and naturalisation application. The administrative errors leading to indefinite leave occurred in that context, and there had been no full disclosure on which the Secretary of State exercised discretion. The statutory condition precedent was therefore satisfied, and the deprivation discretion was lawfully exercised.
5. Applying the structured approach in Chimi, the foreseeable consequences of deprivation did not make the decision disproportionate under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The respondent’s long residence, partner and British children were insufficient on the evidence. Consistently with Muslija, exposure to a finite period of immigration limbo, without more, was not dispositive.

The appeal was dismissed.

1. Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber): The First-tier Tribunal’s decision allowing the appeal was set aside for error of law in the first stage of the proceedings under [2024] UKUT 144 (IAC). The matter was retained for remaking.
2. Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber): On remaking the decision at the resumed hearing, the appeal against deprivation of citizenship was dismissed.