KL v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions

A claimant receiving education cannot qualify for Universal Credit under the disability exception unless the statutory conditions in regulation 14(1)(b) are satisfied. Where education starts after the Universal Credit claim, the claimant must already have been determined to have limited capability for work, or be treated as having it, by the date education starts.

Administrative delay in arranging a work capability assessment does not displace that statutory requirement. Fairness, legitimate expectation and operational targets cannot require the Secretary of State to act contrary to the statutory scheme.

The appellant claimed Universal Credit before restarting a full-time university course. He was entitled to the enhanced daily living component of personal independence payment and had been referred for a work capability assessment, but no assessment or limited capability for work determination had taken place when he began education.

The First-tier Tribunal dismissed the appeal, holding that regulation 14(1)(b) required a prior determination of limited capability for work. The appellant argued that the delay in arranging the assessment was unreasonable and should not deprive him of entitlement. The issue before the Upper Tribunal was whether the exception applied despite the absence of a determination before education began.

1. The appeal was dismissed. The First-tier Tribunal’s decision did not involve a material error of law.
2. Section 4(1)(d) of the Welfare Reform Act 2012 establishes the basic condition that a claimant must not be receiving education. Regulation 12(2) of the Universal Credit Regulations 2013 includes undertaking a full-time course of advanced education within that concept.
3. Regulation 14(1)(b), in the version applicable to the claim, required both entitlement to a designated disability benefit and a determination or treatment that the claimant had limited capability for work or limited capability for work and work-related activity. Where education began after the claim, that determination had to exist on or before the date education began. The later amendment expressed the same temporal requirement more clearly, but did not apply to this claim.
4. The appellant had no limited capability for work determination when he started university. Referral for an assessment was insufficient. The statutory exception therefore did not apply.
5. There was no express statutory duty requiring the Secretary of State to determine the Universal Credit claim, or the limited capability for work issue, by a specified date. Although public law may require claims to be determined within a reasonable time, the court considered that the Covid-related delay was unlikely to be unlawful on these facts.
6. Operational targets or official advice concerning the timing of assessments could not prevent the statutory scheme from operating. Legitimate expectation and estoppel could not require the Secretary of State to act contrary to duties imposed by Parliament.

The appeal was dismissed.

• Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber): [2024] UKUT 392 (AAC) dismissed the appeal and held that the First-tier Tribunal had made no error of law.
• First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber): dismissed the appeal on 9 November 2022, holding that regulation 14(1)(b) did not apply because no limited capability for work determination had been made before education began.