Dominic Stephenson v First-Tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber)

Under paragraph 42(b) of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 2001, “other resultant losses” means losses arising from the loss of parental services. It does not create a general power to compensate every loss following the victim’s death. The provision must be read as a whole, alongside the tariff payment for loss of parental services in paragraph 42(a). The discretion to consider relevant factors and contingencies affects calculation of an eligible payment; it does not enlarge the category of recoverable losses. Household accommodation works, trust-administration fees and Court of Protection costs therefore fall outside paragraph 42(b) where they do not replace the deceased parent’s care. The same result would follow under paragraph 65(b) of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 2012.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision of the First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) dated 16 August 2022 concerning a claim under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 2001. The claim followed the criminal killing of the applicant’s mother when he was a child. The First-tier Tribunal had accepted that paragraph 42(b) could cover some additional losses arising from the loss of parental services, but rejected claims concerning accommodation works, trust administration and Court of Protection costs. The central issues were the meaning of “other resultant losses” and whether those categories of expense fell within the provision.

1. Judicial review dismissed. The First-tier Tribunal’s decision contained no error of law.
2. Paragraph 42(b) had to be construed in the context of paragraph 42 as a whole. Its references to “other payments” and “other resultant losses” followed the provision for loss of parental services in paragraph 42(a). They therefore covered additional losses arising from or resulting from that loss, rather than losses merely connected with the death of the deceased.
3. The reference in the coda to paragraph 42 to relevant factors and contingencies concerned the selection of the appropriate multiplier for payments within paragraph 42(b). It did not determine whether a claimed payment fell within the provision in the first place.
4. The costs of adapting or extending the appointee’s house were general household living expenses. They were not costs replacing the care previously provided by the deceased parent. It was unnecessary to decide whether the works were properly characterised as an adaptation or an extension.
5. Trust-administration costs and Court of Protection costs were likewise outside paragraph 42(b). They arose from the administration or regularisation of civil or compensation claims, or from the applicant’s pre-existing disability, rather than from replacing parental care. The provision did not bring all legal costs associated with a fatal injury within the Scheme.
6. The Court’s conclusion was reached without relying on the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 2012. The differently worded paragraph 65(b) would nevertheless produce the same result because it concerned expenses suffered by the child directly as a result of the loss of parental services.
7. The outstanding care issue remained for the First-tier Tribunal’s further directions.

• First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber): On 16 August 2022, dismissed the relevant claims under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 2001, while leaving the issue of care outstanding.
• Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber): Judicial review dismissed. The First-tier Tribunal’s decision contained no error of law.