Dominic Stephenson v First-Tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber)

Under paragraph 42(b) of the 2001 Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme, “other resultant losses” are losses caused by the criminal act and distinct from the tariff payment for loss of parental services. They are not losses arising merely from the claimant’s status as a qualifying claimant. A claimant’s pre-existing disability therefore cannot, without more, make accommodation or Court of Protection costs recoverable. However, where criminal injury creates a need for adaptations, reasonable adaptation costs may fall within paragraph 35(d)(ii), including a minor extension needed to create a wet room. The appeal was dismissed because the disputed accommodation and Court of Protection costs were not caused by the criminal act.

The appellant, a child when his father killed his mother, claimed compensation under the 2001 Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme. It was accepted that he qualified for a tariff award, child payments and care-related compensation. The dispute concerned accommodation costs and Court of Protection costs.

The First-tier Tribunal awarded sums including loss of parental services and Court of Protection deputyship costs, but made no award for the cost of an extension. On judicial review, the Upper Tribunal held that “other resultant losses” under paragraph 42(b) meant losses arising from loss of parental services and upheld the FTT’s decision: [2024] UKUT 84 (AAC). The central issues were the proper construction of paragraph 42(b), whether the claimed costs were caused by the mother’s death, and whether an extension could ever constitute an accommodation adaptation.

1. Appeal dismissed. The First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal had correctly refused compensation for the disputed extension and Court of Protection costs.
2. Paragraph 42(b) must be read as a whole and within the scheme. “Other resultant losses” means losses resulting from the criminal act which caused the death and the consequent loss of parental services. The phrase refers to losses other than those covered by the tariff payment under paragraph 42(a). It does not extend to anything resulting from the claimant’s status as a qualifying claimant, since that status confers the right to claim rather than causing a loss.
3. The interpretation is consistent with the Guide to Applicants for Compensation in Fatal Cases and Begley. Where a deceased parent had provided unusually extensive care because of a child’s pre-existing disability, the loss of that additional care might fall within paragraph 42(b).
4. The need for adapted accommodation arose from the appellant’s congenital disability and other medical problems, not from the unlawful killing. The same applied to Court of Protection costs, which would have been incurred because of the pre-existing disability. Those losses were therefore outside paragraph 42(b).
5. Although unnecessary to the result, the court corrected the FTT’s general suggestion that an extension could never be recoverable. Under paragraph 35(d)(ii), adaptations to accommodation may include a minor extension, such as enlarging a downstairs lavatory to create a wet room. Whether costs are recoverable depends on the circumstances and remains subject to the scheme’s compensation cap. The court noted that this issue was distinct from the difficulties in assessing damages for replacement accommodation discussed in Roberts v Johnstone and Swift v Carpenter: [1989] QB 878; [2020] EWCA Civ 1295; [2021] QB 339.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal from the Upper Tribunal dismissed. The court held that the claimed accommodation and Court of Protection costs were not losses caused by the criminal act, while giving limited obiter guidance on accommodation adaptations.
• Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber): On judicial review, Upper Tribunal Judge West found no error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s decision: [2024] UKUT 84 (AAC).
• First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber): Awarded £44,210, including compensation for loss of parental services and Court of Protection deputyship costs, but no compensation for the extension.