T Tamponi v Medequip Assistive Technology Ltd

For the purpose of the primary limitation period for discrimination claims, a complaint about a discrete communication is not rendered continuing merely because its alleged error is not later corrected. Even if related communications constitute conduct extending over a period, time runs from the end of that period.

Immigration status remains distinct from race under the Equality Act 2010. Treatment prompted by an employer’s understanding of a change in immigration status and eligibility for a settled-status scheme is not direct race discrimination merely because that change affects persons of particular nationalities.

The claimant, an Italian national employed by the respondent, brought two complaints of direct race discrimination. The first concerned letters sent to EU, EEA and Swiss-national employees about the EU Settlement Scheme and the possible consequences for continued employment. The second concerned disciplinary action after the claimant scrapped returned bath lifts during the Covid-19 pandemic.

The Employment Tribunal at Croydon dismissed both discrimination complaints. It found that the settled-status communications were not a detriment and that neither complaint was presented in time. It also rejected the discrimination allegations on their merits. The claimant appealed on the limitation issue and on the treatment of immigration status and nationality.

1. Appeal dismissed. Both direct race-discrimination complaints were out of time. There was no appeal against the Employment Tribunal’s decision that it would not be just and equitable to extend time.

2. The second complaint concerned the investigation and disciplinary process arising from the January 2021 incident. At the latest, the conduct ended when the disciplinary charges were dismissed on 2 March 2021. A later grievance decision was not itself the subject of a race-discrimination complaint and did not extend the relevant period.

3. The first complaint, as framed, concerned the first settled-status letter. There was no complaint about a continuing failure to follow up or correct it. Even treating the complaint as including the second letter, any period of conduct ended on 9 March 2021, when the second letter stated that proof of an application or visa was not then required. ACAS early conciliation began after the primary limitation periods had expired.

4. Independently, the unchallenged finding that the settled-status letters caused no detriment was fatal to the first complaint.

5. Although unnecessary to the disposition, the tribunal had not erred on the merits. Applying the distinction identified in Onu v Akwiwu and Taiwo v Olaigbe [2016] UKSC 31, race does not include immigration status. The letters were sent because the respondent understood that recipients’ immigration status had changed following Brexit and that they were eligible for the EU Settlement Scheme. Nationality was part of the factual context, but was not an operative reason for the treatment. The case was not factually analogous to James v Eastleigh Borough Council [1990] UKHL 6.

• Employment Appeal Tribunal: dismissed the claimant’s appeal: [2025] EAT 180.
• Employment Tribunal, Croydon: dismissed the direct race-discrimination and protected-disclosure unfair-dismissal complaints, but upheld ordinary unfair dismissal.