AYZ v BZA

Where a person has made an allegation to the police of a sexual offence within section 1(1) of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992, the statutory anonymity protection applies even if the suspect has not been questioned, arrested or charged. The allegation need not be proved, and informal disclosure of it does not amount to the written consent required to waive anonymity.

An Employment Appeal Tribunal judgment is subject to that protection. If naming the complainant in connected employment proceedings would create an unacceptable risk of jigsaw identification, permanent anonymity in those proceedings is necessary. Separate, unlinked judgments may be required to give the statutory protection practical effect.

The appellant had sought permanent anonymity in Employment Tribunal proceedings. The Employment Judge refused the application, applying the ordinary principles of open justice and concluding that no necessary derogation had been established on the material then before the tribunal.

On appeal, the appellant made a further anonymity application. She relied on a police report alleging a sexual assault by the respondent, concerning events outside the Employment Tribunal claim and not disclosed to the Employment Judge. An interim anonymity order had protected her identity during the appeal.

The central issue was whether section 1 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 required permanent anonymity in both the Employment Tribunal and Employment Appeal Tribunal proceedings, to prevent identification through the connection between those proceedings and the police allegation.

1. Application granted. The appellant was to be permanently anonymised in the Employment Tribunal and Employment Appeal Tribunal proceedings.

2. The appellant's report to the police, followed by her emailed particulars, was an allegation for section 1(1) of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992. The protection did not depend on the police taking action, on the truth of the allegation, or on the respondent having been given an opportunity to answer it. The appellant had not given the formal written consent required by section 5(2) to waive the protection.

3. The Tribunal followed A v X, [2019] IRLR 620, in holding that a judgment in non-criminal proceedings falls within the statutory anonymity regime. Although there were arguments either way on the construction of the exception in section 6(1), a coordinate EAT decision on the point should be followed unless an exceptional circumstance identified in Lock v British Gas, [2016] ICR 503, was present. None was.

4. Naming the appellant in the Employment Tribunal proceedings or in the main appeal judgment, while publishing a contemporaneous judgment about the sexual-assault allegation, would create an unacceptable risk of jigsaw identification. Full anonymity in both sets of proceedings was therefore the only effective means of complying with section 1. It also reduced the consequential risk that the respondent would be identified.

5. Two separately issued judgments, with no apparent link between them, were required to make the anonymity effective. The Employment Judge had nevertheless made no error in refusing anonymity on the evidence and arguments then advanced, because the police allegation had not been put before the tribunal.

• Employment Appeal Tribunal: the appellant's further application for permanent anonymity was granted: [2025] EAT 91.
• Employment Tribunal: the Employment Judge had refused a permanent anonymity order. The EAT held that decision was not erroneous on the material then before the tribunal, but granted anonymity because of the subsequently raised police allegation.