West Sussex County Council v AB & Anor

A care order must be necessary and proportionate. It cannot be made merely to oblige a local authority to deliver a care package which it already has statutory duties to provide. A full care order does not give the court continuing jurisdiction to supervise or enforce the approved care plan. Where a child is protected by a deprivation-of-liberty authorisation, the court should assess the real likelihood of parental non-cooperation, the practical value of parental responsibility, continuing court oversight, available Mental Capacity Act 2005 or Court of Protection processes, and the child’s welfare. Substantial parental divergence or doubts about implementation may justify a care order, but modest disagreement and a reliable package will not necessarily do so.

CD, a 16-year-old adopted child with complex needs, was subject to deprivation-of-liberty orders and an interim care order. She lived at home with her mother, supported by a continuous professional care package. On 7 June 2024 HHJ Bedford made a final care order under Children Act 1989, s 31, despite the local authority and the mother agreeing that the package itself would not change.

The local authority appealed, with the mother’s support. The children’s guardian opposed the appeal. The central issue was whether a care order was necessary and proportionate where the care package was authorised through the deprivation-of-liberty process, statutory duties already applied, and the court would remain involved in monitoring the arrangements.

Appeal allowed. The final care order was set aside.

1. The judge erred in law by treating a care order as a means of obliging or galvanising the local authority into delivering the agreed care plan. The statutory duties under Children Act 1989 Part III, together with the other statutory regimes engaged, already required the authority to provide the necessary support. That principle was reaffirmed in Re JW [2023] EWCA Civ 944.
2. A full care order does not impose an additional obligation to comply with the care plan. The court has no jurisdiction to review the operation of the plan or require adherence to its key elements. A local authority may alter the plan after the order, subject to possible discharge or judicial review proceedings. The court applied A v Liverpool City Council [1982] AC 363 and Re S and Re W (Care Order: Implementation of Care Plan) [2002] UKHL 10.
3. Although a court may make an order different from that sought by the local authority, there must be cogent and strong reasons for doing so. The reasons relied on here did not meet that standard. The continuing supervision of the care package through the deprivation-of-liberty proceedings was an important factor which the judge had failed to address.
4. The risk that the mother might withdraw cooperation had some evidential basis, but the past difficulties were comparatively minor when set against her sustained support. Withdrawal was not a likely outcome and, by itself, did not justify a care order. The concern about the child’s approaching seventeenth birthday also did not justify the order. Any later dispute or variation could be addressed within the deprivation-of-liberty process or subsequent Court of Protection proceedings.
5. The possible effect on the child of learning that she was again in care was a significant welfare factor. The professional decision not to tell her about the interim order showed that the concern was substantial, not conjectural, and it had been given insufficient weight.
6. Re JR (Deprivation of Liberty: Care Order: Principles of Care) [2024] EWHC 564 (Fam); [2024] 2 FLR 856 was correct on its materially different facts, involving substantially greater parental divergence and doubts about implementation of the care plan. It did not justify a care order on the facts of the present case.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — On 17 February 2025, the appeal was allowed and the final care order was set aside: [2025] EWCA Civ 132.
2. HHJ Bedford, sitting as a deputy High Court Judge — On 7 June 2024, following a contested hearing, a final care order was made after an interim care order had been in force. The appeal arose from case number SD23C50244.