Betim Onuzi v Secretary of State for the Home Department

On an appeal against deprivation of citizenship under section 40(3) of the British Nationality Act 1981, the First-tier Tribunal decides disputed allegations of fraud, false representation or concealment as facts. It reviews the Secretary of State’s causation decision and deprivation discretion on public-law grounds, while considering other legal obligations such as Article 8. Deception maintained through the immigration and naturalisation process can remain causative despite administrative errors, particularly where a false identity was concealed and citizenship would have been refused had the truth been known. Retention of citizenship obtained by deception is generally exceptional, and delay alone does not make deprivation disproportionate.

The appellant entered the United Kingdom illegally in 1999 and claimed asylum using a false identity, asserting that he was from Kosovo. He later obtained indefinite leave to remain following serious administrative errors and was naturalised as a British citizen in 2007, still using the false identity.

The deception was discovered in 2020. The Secretary of State deprived him of citizenship under section 40(3) of the British Nationality Act 1981. The First-tier Tribunal allowed his appeal, finding that the grant of indefinite leave and subsequent naturalisation resulted mainly from delay and maladministration. The Upper Tribunal set that decision aside and, after a resumed hearing, dismissed the appeal.

The central issues before the Court of Appeal were the proper appellate approach to causation and whether the administrative errors broke the link between the deception and the grant of citizenship.

The appeal was dismissed unanimously.

1. On an appeal under section 40A of the British Nationality Act 1981 against a decision under section 40(3), the First-tier Tribunal must determine disputed questions of fraud, false representation or concealment as facts. The Secretary of State’s decisions on causation and on the discretion to deprive are reviewed on public-law grounds. The Tribunal must also consider other legal obligations, including section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, while giving due weight to the Secretary of State’s findings, evaluations and policies. This approach was stated in Chaudhry [2025] EWCA Civ 16.
2. The critical question was whether naturalisation in 2007 was obtained by means of fraud or false representation. The earlier administrative errors concerning exceptional leave and indefinite leave were only background. They did not break the causative link because the Secretary of State had never made the relevant decisions with full knowledge of the appellant’s prolonged deception and false identity.
3. The deception was undisputed. The appellant’s entire claim to refugee status was fabricated, he maintained the false identity through subsequent applications, and he concealed the truth in his naturalisation application. It was not a public-law error for the Secretary of State to conclude that, had the truth been known, the appellant would have been refused citizenship because he did not satisfy the good-character requirement. On these facts, that was the only realistic conclusion.
4. The proportionality authorities supported the conclusion that retention of citizenship obtained by deception is unusual or exceptional. No loss of other rights resulting from naturalisation was identified. The delay in discovering the fraud did not make deprivation disproportionate, particularly as the deception continued and action followed discovery. There was no reason to remit the case to the Upper Tribunal.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): dismissed the appeal against the Upper Tribunal’s resumed decision. [2025] EWCA Civ 1337
• Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber): set aside the First-tier Tribunal’s decision for error of law on 29 November 2023 and dismissed the appeal after remaking the decision on 7 February 2024.
• First-tier Tribunal: allowed the appellant’s appeal in a decision sent on 15 July 2022.