LR, R (on the application of) v Coventry City Council

An appellate court retains discretion to hear an academic public-law appeal, but must exercise it cautiously. It should ordinarily do so only where there is a good reason in the public interest, such as a discrete point of statutory construction likely to recur in the near future in many similar cases. Fact-specific Convention rights issues are generally unsuitable for determination once no live dispute remains. A statutory issue may also be left undecided where its near-term resolution is not shown and it would be better considered in a case where it matters to the parties.

LR challenged Coventry City Council’s assessment of financial support for her family, who had been subject to immigration restrictions and were receiving assistance under Children Act 1989 section 17. The challenge concerned paragraph 3 of Schedule 3 to the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The Administrative Court rejected the arguments for increased support under section 17 and Article 8, but quashed the assessment on other grounds: [2025] EWHC 20 (Admin). While the application for permission to appeal was pending, the family was granted leave to remain. The appeal consequently became academic. The central issue was whether the Court should nevertheless determine the proposed grounds.

Disposition

The Court unanimously refused permission to appeal. The proposed appeal would have followed only if permission had been granted. The grant of leave to remain meant that no family member was an overstayer, paragraph 1 of Schedule 3 to the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 no longer restricted the family’s position, and LR no longer needed the variation sought. A damages claim mentioned in the judicial review claim was not pursued in the appeal, and the further assessment made pursuant to the High Court’s order was not challenged.

Academic public-law appeals

1. Following the guidance in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Salem, [1999] 1 AC 450, an appellate court has discretion to hear an academic issue involving a public authority. The discretion must be exercised with caution. A good reason in the public interest is ordinarily required, for example where a discrete statutory-construction issue is likely to require resolution in the near future in numerous similar cases.
2. The Article 8 grounds were too fact-specific to justify determination after the appeal had become academic. Although Ground 1 raised a discrete statutory issue concerning paragraph 3 of Schedule 3, it was not evident that the issue would need to be resolved soon. It was preferable to leave it for a case in which it was significant to the parties.

The Court considered the contrasting approach in R (Dolan) v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, [2020] EWCA Civ 1605, where a discrete statutory point was heard in the public interest but other academic issues were left undecided. That example did not justify hearing the present grounds. Lord Justices Singh and Bean agreed with Newey LJ’s reasons.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — The application for permission to appeal was heard on a rolled-up basis. After the appeal became academic, permission was refused: [2025] EWCA Civ 1408.
• Administrative Court, High Court of Justice, King’s Bench Division — The court rejected the claims for increased support under section 17 of the Children Act 1989 and Article 8, but declared the challenged assessment unlawful and quashed it on other grounds: [2025] EWHC 20 (Admin).