FW Aviation (Holdings) 1 Limited v Vietjet Aviation Joint Stock Company

In contempt proceedings concerning an injunction, the order’s terms define the court’s purpose. An injunction respondent cannot be held in civil contempt for conduct which the order does not prohibit. Nor can criminal contempt extend the injunction by treating non-prohibited conduct as contrary to an undefined spirit or purpose. Criminal contempt remains available for conduct that independently interferes with the administration of justice, such as disrupting a trial or threatening witnesses. In third-party injunction cases, liability requires both an act which would breach the injunction if done by the respondent and interference with the administration of justice. Applicants must define prohibited conduct clearly and unequivocally. Appeal allowed.

FW Aviation obtained an interim prohibitory injunction restraining VietJet from interfering with FW Aviation’s possession, custody and control of four aircraft. VietJet later sent letters to Vietnamese public authorities concerning the export of the aircraft. FW Aviation sought permission to amend its contempt application to allege that the letters constituted criminal contempt because they attempted to circumvent the injunction’s spirit and purpose. It expressly disavowed any allegation that the letters breached the injunction. Picken J granted permission to amend: [2025] EWHC 380 (Comm). VietJet appealed on the question whether an injunction respondent can commit contempt by conduct contrary to the injunction’s purpose without breaching its terms.

Appeal allowed. Lord Justice Males delivered the judgment, with Lord Justice Baker and Lady Justice Falk agreeing. The court accepted the factual case at its highest for amendment purposes, but held that the central issue was a question of law which could properly be decided before trial.

1. An injunction must state clearly and unequivocally what conduct is prohibited. Its terms are strictly construed. Heightened procedural fairness applies to committal proceedings, and breach must be proved to the criminal standard. It would be inconsistent with those principles to impose contempt for conduct contrary only to an undefined spirit or purpose.
2. An injunction respondent may commit criminal contempt through conduct which independently interferes with the administration of justice, including conduct such as disrupting a trial, threatening witnesses or publishing material likely to prejudice a fair trial. However, where the alleged contempt consists only of subverting an injunction’s purpose without breaching its terms, there is no scope for criminal contempt.
3. For third-party injunction cases, the actus reus requires both an act which, if done by the injunction respondent, would breach the injunction and interference with the administration of justice in the action. The references in Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd [1992] 1 AC 191, Attorney General v Punch Ltd [2002] UKHL 50 and Wolverhampton City Council v London Gypsies and Travellers [2023] UKSC 47 to subverting an injunction’s purpose did not enlarge that requirement.
4. The purpose of an interlocutory injunction is co-extensive with the effect its terms show it was intended to have between the parties. Criminal contempt cannot be invoked to extend the injunction beyond those terms. FW Aviation’s proposed grounds 3(a) and 3(c), based on conduct which it accepted was not a breach, therefore had no real prospect of success.

The High Court’s order was set aside insofar as it permitted those amendments.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal allowed and the order permitting grounds 3(a) and 3(c) was set aside: [2025] EWCA Civ 1458.
2. High Court of Justice, King’s Bench Division, Commercial Court: Picken J granted permission to amend the contempt application: [2025] EWHC 380 (Comm).