Rupert Junior Geddes (R, on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

For the purposes of sections 78 and 79 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, the circumstances in which an appeal remains not finally determined are exhaustively specified by section 104(2). A pending application for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court is outside that statutory list. Unless a stay has been granted, it therefore does not prevent a deportation order being made after the relevant appeal has otherwise been finally determined. The legislative history confirms that Parliament deliberately replaced a broad reference to further appeals with a defined list of appellate stages.

The appellant, a Jamaican national convicted of wounding with intent, challenged a deportation order made after his immigration appeal had been dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal and the Court of Appeal. He had applied to the Supreme Court for permission to appeal, but no stay was in force when the deportation order was made. The High Court, in [2024] EWHC 66 (Admin), held that the order could lawfully be made. The central issue was whether the pending Supreme Court permission application meant that the earlier appeal remained pending under section 104 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

Appeal dismissed. Lord Justice Bean gave the leading judgment. Lady Justice Elisabeth Laing and Lord Justice Edis agreed.

1. Sections 78 and 79 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 restrict removal and the making of a deportation order while an appeal under section 82(1) remains pending. Section 104 defines when that appeal is pending and when it is finally determined.
2. Section 104(2) is exhaustive. It identifies the appellate applications, granted appeals and remittals which prevent final determination. The specified routes include permission applications and appeals involving the Upper Tribunal and the Court of Appeal under sections 11 to 14 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. A pending application for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court is not included.
3. The legislative history supported that construction. The original provision referred broadly to a further appeal which could be brought or had been instituted. The 2005 and 2010 amendments replaced that wording with specific statutory circumstances. Parliament’s express inclusion of some appellate stages indicated the exclusion of others. The Upper Tribunal’s decision in Niaz, [2019] UKUT 00399 (IAC), was rightly decided and supported the same conclusion.
4. The possibility of a leapfrog appeal created no practical anomaly. Such appeals are rare, require a certificate concerning a point of law of general public importance, and would ordinarily be accompanied by an application for a stay. The absence of an automatic statutory bar therefore caused no difficulty.

The deportation order was consequently lawful in the absence of a stay.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2025] EWCA Civ 353, the appeal was dismissed.
• High Court (Administrative Court): Lane J held in [2024] EWHC 66 (Admin) that a deportation order could lawfully be made while an application for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court remained outstanding.
• Earlier proceedings: The appellant’s immigration appeal was dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal and the Court of Appeal in [2016] EWCA Civ 1042. The Supreme Court refused permission to appeal in 2022.