Knot Builders Ltd, R (on the application of) v Construction Industry Training Board

A public authority should apply its published policy consistently. It must consider departing from that policy only where the applicant makes representations identifying an exceptional reason for departure. A vague request for fairness or co-operation does not require the authority to search its policies and raise possible departures itself.

Published grant policies remain subordinate to the statutory purpose. Their omissions cannot require grants to be paid where the claimant has done nothing to foster suitable training. Eligibility required the applicant to identify the need for training, organise it and accept its cost.

The claimant operated a contracting and payroll business for construction operatives. The Construction Industry Training Board registered it as liable to levy and later rejected its applications for training grants, wholly for one grant year and partly for two others.

Ellenbogen J partly allowed the claimant’s judicial review application, remitting one issue and dismissing the remainder. The claimant appealed, and the Board cross-appealed. The issues included the waiting period for newly registered employers, alleged legitimate expectations arising from counsel’s submissions, the application of three grant requirements omitted from two policies, and whether the claimant satisfied those requirements.

1. Disposition. The claimant’s appeal was dismissed and the Board’s cross-appeal was allowed. The Judge was wrong to find that the claimant had made an implied request for disapplication of the waiting period.
2. Published policy. The starting point, applying the principles in R (Lumba) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 12, was that the Board was expected to apply its published policy. A departure could arise where an applicant made representations that an aspect of the policy should not apply for an exceptional reason. The claimant’s general request for co-operation did not impose a duty on the Board to identify the waiting period, invite representations about it or consider disapplying it.
3. Registration and inquiries. The Board had no broad public-law duty to investigate and register an entity while that entity was actively resisting registration. Its duties were no wider than the duty to make reasonable inquiries described in Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council [1977] AC 1014. The Board was not required to infer liability from Construction Industry Training Board v Beacon Roofing [2011] EWCA Civ 1203, which concerned a different entity and issue.
4. Grant requirements. The statutory purpose in the Industrial Training Act 1982 was to encourage suitable training. The policies could not require the Board to subvert that purpose. Applying the three requirements to the retrospective claim did not create an unlawful secret policy because the claimant was informed of them before applying and had the opportunity to make representations. The claimant had not identified training needs, organised the training or accepted its financial cost. Paying operatives for time spent training, while recovering the cost from clients, was insufficient.
5. Legitimate expectation and relief. Counsel’s earlier submissions were not a clear and unambiguous representation that a future, unmade grant application would succeed. If necessary, relief could also have been refused under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, since the outcome would highly likely have been the same had the Board known of the claimant’s restructuring.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division). The claimant’s appeal from the decision below was dismissed and the Board’s cross-appeal was allowed: [2025] EWCA Civ 6.
2. Administrative Court and Planning Court, London. Ellenbogen J partly allowed the judicial review, remitting one issue and dismissing the remainder.