The General Dental Council v Nabeel Aga

A substantive suspension directed after a finding of impaired fitness to practise and an immediate suspension order pending appeal are distinct statutory measures. The maximum 12-month period in section 27B(6)(b) of the Dentists Act 1984 limits the substantive direction only. It does not require time served under an immediate order to be deducted from that direction.

In sections 29A and 30, a direction taking effect means that the substantive suspension commences at the statutorily specified event. An immediate suspension begins when ordered and ends as section 30(3) provides. The statutory scheme contains no set-off mechanism; any change to its consequences is a matter for Parliament.

The respondent dentist was found guilty of misconduct and impaired fitness to practise. The Professional Conduct Committee directed a nine-month substantive suspension, with review, under section 27B(6)(b) of the Dentists Act 1984, and ordered immediate suspension under section 30.

On the dentist’s appeal, Ritchie J upheld the sanction but held that the immediate and substantive suspensions formed one continuous suspension. He quashed and substituted the direction so that time served under the immediate order was deducted: [2023] EWHC 3208 (Admin).

The General Dental Council appealed. The central issue was whether the statutory scheme requires an immediate suspension order to be set off against the period of substantive suspension.

1. Appeal allowed. The judge had erred in treating the immediate suspension and the substantive suspension as one continuous period. A direction under section 27B(6)(b) and an order under section 30 of the Dentists Act 1984 are distinct measures. The direction is a necessary precondition to an immediate order, but the order is not parasitic upon it in a sense that merges their legal operation.

2. The 12-month maximum in section 27B(6)(b) governs only the period specified in a substantive suspension direction. It does not limit the duration for which registration may also have been suspended under a section 30 immediate order. The Act separately permits extensions of a substantive suspension following review, reinforcing that the statutory limit is not an aggregate cap on all periods of suspension.

3. The phrase “take effect” in section 29A means commence or start. A substantive suspension therefore starts on expiry of the appeal period, or on the relevant disposition of an appeal. An immediate suspension starts forthwith when ordered and ends at the events specified by section 30(3). There is no basis for attributing different meanings to the same operative phrase or for treating the immediate order as a credit against the substantive sanction.

4. The statutory scheme makes no provision for set-off. The Court approved the interpretation adopted in Professional Standards Authority for Health and Social Care v General Dental Council and Arthif Danial, [2024] EWHC 2610 (Admin). The possibility that an immediate order may extend the total time during which a dentist is unable to practise does not justify a contrary construction. The protection of the public remains the governing objective, and the statutory review process allows fitness to practise and remediation to be assessed.

5. The Court added that, where a judge raises an unargued point contrary to established professional-disciplinary practice and with wider implications, fairness normally requires both written and full oral submissions before determination.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed the General Dental Council’s appeal and held that time spent under a section 30 immediate suspension order is not deducted from a substantive suspension direction.
• High Court, Administrative Court: Ritchie J upheld the nine-month sanction but treated the immediate and substantive suspensions as one period and required credit for time already served: [2023] EWHC 3208 (Admin).