Thomas James Thorpe v R

A sexual harm prevention order may prohibit employment involving likely unsupervised contact with children even where the Safeguarding of Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 may automatically bar the offender from regulated activity. The regimes operate together, but the order must not conflict with the statutory scheme.

An additional prohibition is justified only where it is reasonably necessary and proportionate to address a real risk of unsupervised contact arising from activity outside the statutory definition of regulated activity. The court must consider existing SHPO restrictions and the individual evidence of risk, rather than adopt a safety-first approach. An attempt to commit an offence under section 8 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 triggers automatic barring under the prescribed criteria, even without an actual child victim. The appeal was dismissed.

Following convictions including an attempt to cause or incite a child under 13 to engage in penetrative sexual activity, the Crown Court at Kingston upon Thames imposed a sexual harm prevention order on 4 June 2024. Paragraph 11 prohibited seeking or undertaking employment likely to bring the appellant into unsupervised contact with children under 16. Other restrictions were not challenged.

The first two grounds of appeal were dismissed on 10 June 2025. On ground 3, the appellant argued that paragraph 11 conflicted with or duplicated the statutory barring regime under the Safeguarding of Vulnerable Groups Act 2006. The prosecution accepted that the regimes must not conflict, but argued that an SHPO could address employment outside regulated activity. The central issue was whether paragraph 11 was reasonably necessary to address a real risk of unsupervised contact in circumstances not covered by the statutory regime.

Ground 3 and the appeal were dismissed. The court held as follows.

1. Under sections 345 and 346(1)(a) of the SA 2020, an SHPO may be imposed where necessary to protect the public or particular members of the public from sexual harm. Under section 343, its prohibitions must be necessary and proportionate in the individual case. They should not be imposed merely as a safety-first precaution. The principles in Sokolowski [2018] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 30 were applied.

2. The statutory barring regime does not prevent an additional SHPO prohibition. The regimes must operate together without conflict. Relevant employment may fall outside the definition of regulated activity under the Safeguarding of Vulnerable Groups Act 2006. In that event, an SHPO may address the residual risk. This reflected the approach in R v Smith [2012] 1 Cr App R (S) 82.

3. Under section 7, a barred person must not engage in, seek or offer to engage in regulated activity. Regulated activity includes specified teaching, training, care, supervision, advice, guidance and driving activities involving children, subject to statutory frequency and timing conditions. Accordingly, restricting the appellant from seeking relevant employment did not create a wider restriction in relation to regulated activity merely because it included seeking employment.

4. The operative question was whether paragraph 11 was reasonably necessary because of a real risk of unsupervised contact with a child under 16 arising from activity covered by the paragraph but outside regulated activity. The court had to consider the existing prohibition in paragraph 10 and the individual evidence of danger. That evidence included grooming behaviour, possession of images, concerning internet searches and the appellant’s attitude.

5. The conviction for attempting to commit an offence under section 8 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 triggered automatic barring under the prescribed criteria. The absence of an actual child did not prevent barring because section 8 is child-specific and the relevant regulations include attempts. Paragraph 11 was framed to address circumstances outside the statutory regime and possible reliance on exceptions in paragraph 10. Although the issue had not been explored below as fully as it should have been, the court could not conclude that the risk was insufficient to justify the term.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): On 10 June 2025, the first two grounds were dismissed and judgment on ground 3 was reserved. On 30 July 2025, ground 3 failed and the appeal was dismissed: [2025] EWCA Crim 1007.
• Crown Court at Kingston upon Thames: On 4 June 2024, following conviction, the court imposed the sexual harm prevention order containing paragraph 11.