R v Anthony Finbar McGrath

The Court of Appeal will extend time for a criminal appeal only where the interests of justice justify doing so. The applicant must provide a good explanation for delay, and the court will examine the merits of the proposed grounds. A defendant has no general right to advance fresh instructions on appeal. After a single judge has considered an application, new grounds require permission to vary the notice of appeal, and the hurdle is high. Fresh evidence must satisfy the statutory criteria, including capability of belief, potential to support the appeal, admissibility at trial, and a reasonable explanation for its earlier absence. Where the prosecution does not rely on cross-admissibility, there is no automatic requirement for a separate cross-admissibility direction if the jury receives clear directions to consider each count separately and the evidence supporting each count.

The appellant was convicted at Luton Crown Court in January 2019 of five fraud offences and one count of perverting the course of justice. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of eight years’ imprisonment.

A single judge refused leave to appeal in February 2021. The appellant renewed his application, repeatedly changed his proposed grounds, sought substantial extensions of time, and requested to rely on fresh evidence. The renewed application ultimately advanced nine grounds, including challenges concerning bad character evidence, alleged trial misrepresentation, a witness’s mental health, fresh evidence, and cross-admissibility. The central issues were whether time should be extended, whether the grounds could be varied, whether fresh evidence should be admitted, and whether any ground was arguable.

Application dismissed; extension of time refused.

1. Extension of time and variation of grounds. The principles in R v Hughes [2009] EWCA Crim 841, R v Thorsby [2015] EWCA Crim 1, R v Wilson [2016] EWCA Crim 65 and R v James [2018] EWCA Crim 285; [2018] 1 WLR 2749 were applied. The nearly six-year delay, repeated replacement grounds and failure to comply with directions were unjustified. The merits were also examined, but none of the proposed grounds was arguable. The court also applied the principle in R v N and LE (Vinh Cong) [2013] QB 379 that a defendant has no general right to advance fresh instructions about the facts on appeal.
2. Fresh evidence. The evidence concerning fireplaces and payments was largely hearsay, speculation or opinion, could have been obtained and used at trial, and lacked a reasonable explanation for its absence. Even if accepted, it could not arguably undermine the convictions. The statutory requirements in section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 were therefore not met.
3. Bad character evidence. The judge was entitled to refuse evidence of a prosecution witness’s previous convictions. The proposed material did not provide an arguable basis for disturbing the convictions and the related ground added nothing.
4. Cross-admissibility. Following R v AHC [2022] EWCA Crim 925, where the prosecution does not rely on cross-admissibility there is no automatic requirement for a cross-admissibility direction. The clear direction to consider each count separately, together with count-specific identification of the prosecution evidence, was sufficient.

The court dismissed the renewed application on both procedural and merits grounds. The Crown’s application for costs limited to counsel’s disbursements was refused.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The renewed application for leave to appeal against convictions entered at Luton Crown Court on 23 January 2019 was dismissed. The necessary extension of time was refused.
• Single judge of the Court of Appeal: Leave was refused on 5 February 2021. The renewed application was dismissed by the full court under [2025] EWCA Crim 1103.
• Crown Court at Luton: The appellant was convicted on 23 January 2019 and sentenced on 24 January 2019 to an aggregate term of eight years’ imprisonment.