R v YAW

Evidence that a complainant made a previous false complaint of rape is non-defendant bad character evidence. There must first be a proper evidential basis from which a jury could properly conclude that the complaint was false. This requires more than material merely consistent with falsity, although it falls short of a strong factual foundation. Where section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 is not engaged, admissibility is governed by section 100(1)(b) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Trial judges must evaluate such applications cautiously, and appellate courts should show considerable deference to that evaluation.

The appellant appealed, with leave, against his conviction for raping his adult daughter. He admitted sexual intercourse and had pleaded guilty to an offence contrary to section 64 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, but denied rape and relied on consent and reasonable belief in consent.

At trial, the appellant applied under section 100 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to adduce evidence concerning an earlier rape allegation made by the complainant against a former partner. The judge refused the application, finding no proper evidential basis from which the earlier allegation could properly be found false, and alternatively finding that it lacked substantial probative value. The appeal challenged both conclusions. The central issue was whether the material was sufficient to permit a proper inference that the earlier complaint was false.

1. The appeal was dismissed. The conviction was safe.
2. Evidence that a complainant had made a false complaint of rape on another occasion was non-defendant bad character evidence for the purposes of section 100 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The court endorsed the seven propositions summarised in R v Hurley [2025] EWCA Crim 642. A proper evidential basis was required before section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 could be avoided. Where the proposed questioning concerned what the complainant had said, rather than her sexual behaviour, section 41 was not engaged and section 100 governed admissibility.
3. The proper evidential basis threshold was below a strong factual foundation, but there had to be some material from which a jury could properly conclude that the previous complaint was false. A judge should not set the threshold too high or too low. Since the proposed cross-examination concerned credit and a collateral issue, caution was required before introducing satellite issues lacking a real evidential foundation.
4. The material relied on consisted principally of hearsay reports of inconsistencies and a remark which might indicate hostility towards the alleged offender. Those matters could be consistent with a false complaint, but they could also be consistent with a true complaint. The occurrence log contained no indication that the complainant had admitted or hinted that the allegation was false, or that the alleged offender had been questioned. The application therefore involved a substantial circularity of reasoning.
5. The trial judge had evaluated all the relevant material and directed himself correctly. In accordance with R v Conn [2018] EWCA Crim 1752, considerable deference was owed to that evaluation, and the appellate court should be slow to interfere. The judge’s conclusion could not be said to be wrong. Ground 1 failed, so ground 2 did not arise and the court made no further determination of substantial probative value.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In R v YAW [2025] EWCA Crim 1143, the court dismissed the appeal and upheld the safety of the conviction.
• Crown Court at Portsmouth: The trial judge refused the application to adduce evidence of the alleged previous false complaint under section 100 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.