R v BPR

For sentencing a service offence involving disobedience, a clear and knowingly breached standing order may properly be classified as deliberate high culpability even without proof of a long-held plan. Harm is assessed by weighing all actual and potential consequences. Significant personal risk to the offender and potential security or reputational risk to the United Kingdom can justify Category 1 harm. The Guidance on Sentencing in the Service Courts is not statutory or binding, but it is considered and authoritative guidance, and good reason is required to depart from it. Dismissal from service is a distinct penalty, not double punishment, and may be necessary where deliberate disobedience by a senior non-commissioned officer creates serious service or national risks.

The applicant, a serving senior non-commissioned officer, pleaded guilty to an offence contrary to section 13 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 by breaching a Standing Order prohibiting service personnel from travelling to Ukraine. During an approved career break, he travelled to Ukraine and served with the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The Catterick Military Court Centre sentenced him to eight months’ service detention and dismissal from the Service. He challenged the categorisation of the offence as deliberate, the assessment of harm as Category 1, and the decision to dismiss him. The central issues were whether the guideline had been correctly applied and whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.

The application for leave to appeal against sentence was refused.

1. Culpability. The Court Martial correctly classified the breach as Category A deliberate contravention. The applicant had applied for his career break knowing that he remained a serving member of the armed forces and subject to military law. He knew of the Standing Order. The finding of premeditation was based on the deliberate steps taken after the career break began, including arranging travel, crossing the border, contacting the Ukrainian authorities and accepting their military authority. It did not depend on proof of a long-held plan to travel to Ukraine.
2. Harm. The Court Martial was entitled to place the offence in Category 1. The applicant placed himself at significant personal risk and his conduct had the potential to create significant security and reputational risks to the United Kingdom.
3. Status of the guideline. The Guidance on Sentencing in the Service Courts lacks the statutory status of civilian sentencing guidance. It is nevertheless considered and authoritative guidance. Good reason is required before a Court Martial properly departs from it. The Court Martial had not treated itself as bound to impose a particular sentence. It had applied the guideline and imposed service detention at the bottom of the applicable range. Service detention is distinct from imprisonment.
4. Dismissal. Dismissal from the Service is a severe additional penalty but is not impermissible double punishment. The Court Martial had to consider whether the offence was sufficiently serious to make dismissal necessary. It was entitled to conclude that deliberate disobedience by a senior non-commissioned officer, involving potential serious difficulty for the United Kingdom if he had been killed, wounded or captured, crossed that threshold.
5. The sentence was not manifestly excessive. The application for leave to appeal against sentence therefore failed and was refused.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The application for leave to appeal against sentence was referred to the full court and refused in [2025] EWCA Crim 1147.
• Catterick Military Court Centre: Judge Legard sentenced the applicant, following his guilty plea, to eight months’ service detention and dismissal from the Service.