R v Kyle Joseph Peters

For a standalone conviction for violent disorder, the sentencing category must reflect the culpability and harm established on the accepted basis of plea. A category 1A classification is proper where the group targeted individuals and the incident involved widespread or serious violence and extreme harm, including death or serious fear, distress or disruption.

Comparisons with co-defendants sentenced concurrently for homicide are generally unreliable where the violent disorder formed part of the homicide offending and the present defendant was sentenced for a standalone offence. A sentence is not manifestly excessive where the judge selects the correct category, accounts for aggravating and mitigating factors, and places the sentence at the bottom of the applicable range.

The appellant pleaded guilty to a standalone offence of violent disorder under section 2(1) of the Public Order Act 1986. The Central Criminal Court sentenced him to 33 months' imprisonment, comprising a three-year sentence reduced by three months for his guilty plea.

He appealed with permission, arguing that the judge should have used category 2A or 1B rather than category 1A, and that his sentence was disproportionate compared with defendants convicted of homicide and violent disorder arising from the same incident. The central issues were the appropriate sentencing category and whether the comparisons established unjustified disparity.

1. Appeal dismissed. The sentence was neither manifestly excessive nor wrong in principle.
2. The sentencing judge had selected the correct category for a standalone violent disorder offence. The accepted facts established culpability level A because the group targeted individuals and participated in widespread or large-scale violence and serious acts of violence. Harm level 1 was also justified by the extreme category 2 factors, including the death of one person and serious fear, distress or disruption. The appellant was not responsible for the unlawful killing and had never been prosecuted for homicide, but those matters did not prevent the incident being assessed under the applicable violent disorder guideline.
3. The judge properly considered the aggravating factors, namely that the appellant took and produced a knife and acted under the influence of alcohol. She also considered the significant mitigation, including the absence of relevant previous convictions, his family and employment circumstances, his conduct while on bail, and the fact that he walked away before the fatal stabbing. Reducing the four-year starting point to three years placed the sentence at the bottom of the three-to-four-and-a-half-year range. A further three-month reduction was made for the guilty plea.
4. The comparison with the other defendants did not establish disparity. Their violent disorder sentences were concurrent with sentences for murder or manslaughter and were described as academic because the violent disorder formed part of the homicide circumstances. Their cases therefore did not provide a reliable comparison with a standalone offence. Even if their sentencing judge had identified a lower starting point incorrectly, that error was immaterial to the appellant's appeal.
5. The sentencing judge had tried related cases and was particularly familiar with the facts and CCTV evidence. The sentencing exercise involved no error of principle. The appeal was dismissed.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2025] EWCA Crim 1175, the appeal against sentence was dismissed.
2. Central Criminal Court: On 14 March 2025, HHJ Dhir KC sentenced the appellant to 33 months' imprisonment for standalone violent disorder.