R v ICG

When reviewing a sentence for manifest excessiveness, the Court of Appeal assesses the sentence in the context of the whole offending and the sentencing judge’s exercise of judgment. An attempted offence may warrant a reduction from the sentence for the completed offence, but the reduction need not be substantial where accompanying offences committed at the same time are sentenced concurrently, earlier offending forms part of the background, and completion was prevented by fear of detection rather than remorse. Abuse of trust, the young age and particular vulnerability of a child, and the circumstances in which offending occurs may justify moving above a guideline starting point. The totality principle may be implemented through concurrent sentences and reductions to sentences for separate offences. It need not be expressed in a single overall figure if the sentencing remarks show that it was genuinely applied.

Following a retrial in the Crown Court at Chester, the appellant was convicted of sexual activity with a child, attempted rape and sexual assault, arising from sexual abuse of a child whom he treated as a daughter. He was also convicted at an earlier trial of sexual assault and possession of indecent photographs, but the appeal concerned the sentence imposed after the retrial. The sentencing judge imposed an aggregate term of 16 years’ imprisonment, including nine years for attempted rape, six years for sexual activity involving digital penetration, and consecutive sentences for two further offences.

With permission, the appellant appealed against sentence on three grounds: that the sentence for attempted rape was excessive because the rape was not completed; that the sentence for digital penetration was excessive because there was no violence or threat and abuse of trust had been double counted; and that the aggregate sentence failed to give effect to totality. The central issue was whether the sentence was manifestly excessive or affected by an error of principle.

1. Appeal dismissed. The sentence was not manifestly excessive and there was no error of principle. The sentencing judge was particularly well placed to assess the appellant’s criminality and the effect on the complainant.
2. For attempted rape, the sentence could be lower than the sentence for the completed offence, but the reduction was not required to be substantial. The court could take account of concurrent offences committed at the same time, earlier offending against the complainant, the fact that the attempt was stopped by concern about being overheard and detected rather than by remorse, and the serious consequences for the complainant. A sentence at the bottom of the guideline range for the completed offence was therefore open to the judge.
3. For the offence involving digital penetration, the judge was entitled to move above the five-year starting point. The complainant’s age, her particular vulnerability while unwell and the appellant’s abuse of his trusted parental role, taken together, justified the sentence imposed. The absence of violence or threats did not prevent those features from aggravating the offence.
4. The totality principle did not require concurrent sentences merely because the offences were sexual offences committed against the same complainant. Consecutive sentences were justified where offences were separate in time or arose on different occasions. Totality was applied through concurrent sentences for offences committed together and real reductions to the sentences for other counts. It was unnecessary for the judge to state expressly that the aggregate figure was appropriate if the sentencing remarks demonstrated that totality had been taken into account.
5. The appeal against sentence was dismissed.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): in [2025] EWCA Crim 1196, the appeal against the aggregate sentence was dismissed.
2. Crown Court at Chester: after retrial, the appellant was convicted and sentenced to a total of 16 years’ imprisonment.