R v Istvan Szobollodi

In criminal contempt proceedings, the court must comply with the essential safeguards in the Criminal Procedure Rules. It must explain that the respondent may take legal advice, allow a reasonable opportunity to obtain it, and explain the procedure at the enquiry. A failure to do so is serious where it prevents submissions on the legal basis of the alleged contempt and deprives an unrepresented respondent of procedural safeguards.

Minor departures from the Rules do not necessarily make a hearing unfair. The effect depends on whether the respondent was prejudiced. A finding of contempt and any financial penalty cannot stand where the omitted safeguards render the hearing unfair.

The appellant attended the Crown Court at Bristol for jury service but stated that, as a matter of principle, he would not participate in jury decision-making or make the required affirmation. A resident judge treated that stance as contempt of court and imposed a financial penalty of £700.

The court office incorrectly recorded the decision as a criminal conviction and sentence, and referred to an irrelevant statutory provision. The appellant, who was unrepresented at the hearing, sought permission to appeal out of time after learning of that record.

On appeal, the central issues included whether the conduct fell within section 20 of the Juries Act 1974, whether it could amount to common-law contempt, and whether the procedure had been fair under the Criminal Procedure Rules.

Appeal allowed. The court granted a four-day extension of time, quashed the finding of contempt, and quashed the £700 financial penalty.

1. The Crown Court has inherent power to deal with contempt. A decision imposing contempt sanctions must be recorded as a finding of contempt, rather than as a criminal conviction and sentence. The court endorsed that point in R v Yaxley-Lennon [2018] 2 Cr App R 30.

2. The court did not determine whether the appellant's stated refusal was conduct within section 20 of the Juries Act 1974, in particular whether he was not available when called to serve as a juror. Nor did it decide whether, if section 20 did not apply, the conduct could be dealt with under the inherent contempt jurisdiction. Those issues had not been considered by the judge below.

3. The judge committed serious procedural errors. Under rule 48.5, the appellant should have been told that he could take legal advice and given a reasonable opportunity to do so. Under rule 48.8, he should also have been told what procedure the enquiry would follow. The omissions were especially material because he was unrepresented and might have advanced submissions on the jurisdictional issues.

4. Other departures from the detailed requirements of rule 48 would not necessarily have made the hearing unfair. The judge had substantially identified the conduct and allowed the appellant to respond. However, the failure to explain the right to legal advice and the procedure deprived him of safeguards before a serious finding and significant financial penalty. The finding and penalty could not stand.

5. As the appellant had paid the penalty, lost employment following the erroneous record, and was not responsible for the procedural errors, it would be unjust to require a rehearing.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Granted an extension of time, allowed the appeal, and quashed the finding of contempt and financial penalty: [2025] EWCA Crim 1204.
• Crown Court at Bristol: On 22 April 2024, found the appellant in contempt of court and imposed a £700 financial penalty. No citation was stated.