R v Shwehe Ahmed

Immigration status is not a general aggravating factor in sentencing. It may be relevant where a specific feature of the offending makes it appropriate, but a court should not treat illegal entry itself, or an uncharged immigration offence, as aggravating. On a sentence appeal, the issue is whether the overall sentence is wrong in principle or manifestly excessive; an erroneous sentencing observation does not automatically require a reduction. Consecutive sentences may be imposed for separate incidents. Destitution may mitigate sentence, but its significance depends on the circumstances and is reduced where the offence involves actual or threatened violence.

The applicant pleaded guilty at the Crown Court at Wood Green to robbery, affray and possessing an offensive weapon. On 18 July 2025, His Honour Judge Godfrey imposed a total sentence of 15 months’ imprisonment.

The applicant challenged the sentence on the grounds that the judge wrongly treated his illegal entry into the United Kingdom as aggravating, wrongly imposed consecutive sentences, and thereby imposed a manifestly excessive sentence. The appeal concerned the proper relevance of immigration status, the effect of separate incidents on totality, and the correct approach to appellate review of sentence.

Application refused. The sentence was not wrong in principle or manifestly excessive.

1. Immigration status may be relevant in some offences and circumstances. For example, illegal entry for the purpose of committing offences might disclose a specific aggravating feature, although conventional factors such as planning may sufficiently address the seriousness. The court rejected treating illegal entry as an aggravating factor of general application. The Crown Court is not well placed to determine the validity or arguability of an asylum claim, and such policy and resource questions are better addressed by the Sentencing Council. The judge had not identified any specific feature of this offending making illegal entry aggravating. Treating the applicant as having committed an uncharged immigration offence would have been wrong in principle.
2. The applicant relied on R v Lounds [2014] 1 Cr App R(S) 75 and R v Harper (1968) 52 Cr App R 21 to submit that the sentencing error required a reduction regardless of the overall sentence. Those decisions were fact-specific. The relevant appellate question was whether the overall sentence was wrong in principle or manifestly excessive, not whether every statement in the sentencing remarks was correct.
3. The robbery and affray arose from separate incidents. Consecutive sentences were therefore not wrong in principle. Concurrent sentences with an increase to the lead sentence would also have been permissible.
4. The robbery was properly placed in category B3, with a starting point of two years’ imprisonment. The judge was entitled to regard the use of the screwdriver as close to the high culpability category. The affray was also properly placed in category B3 and at its upper end. Destitution, lack of previous convictions and the applicant’s injury provided limited mitigation. The guilty plea credit and further reduction for totality were appropriate. In view of the threatening and violent nature of the offending, the total sentence of 15 months was not manifestly excessive.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — On 29 August 2025, the application for leave to appeal against sentence was refused: [2025] EWCA Crim 1235.
2. Crown Court at Wood Green — On 18 July 2025, His Honour Judge Godfrey sentenced the applicant to a total of 15 months’ imprisonment following guilty pleas to robbery, affray and possessing an offensive weapon.