R v David Sladden

On an Attorney General’s reference, a sentence is unduly lenient only if it falls outside the range that the sentencing judge could reasonably consider appropriate. The Court of Appeal gives particular weight to the first-instance judge’s assessment of competing aggravating and mitigating factors. Leave should not be granted in borderline cases because section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 addresses gross error. Even where a sentence is unduly lenient, the court retains a discretion whether to exercise its powers. The same appellate restraint applies to suspension of a custodial sentence where the relevant factors have been considered.

The Solicitor General sought leave under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 to refer a sentence imposed on David Sladden by the Crown Court at Canterbury. He had pleaded guilty to controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship, contrary to sections 76(1) and 76(11) of the Serious Crime Act 2015.

The Recorder placed the offending in category A1, indicated 20 months’ imprisonment reduced to 18 months for the guilty plea, and imposed a suspended sentence order. The reference challenged both the length of the sentence and its suspension. The central issues were whether the sentence was unduly lenient and whether the judge was entitled to suspend it.

Reference refused. The court refused leave to refer the sentence.

1. The offending was properly placed in category A1, with a starting point of 30 months’ custody. It involved serious aggravating features, including violence and offending in the presence of children, but also significant mitigation, including previous good character, compliance with bail, absence of further offending and prospects of rehabilitation.

2. The first-instance sentencing judge is particularly well placed to assess the weight of competing factors. A sentence is unduly lenient only when it falls outside the range of sentences that the judge might reasonably consider appropriate. Leave should not be granted in borderline cases. Section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 is directed to cases involving gross error.

3. The sentence was lenient, and the Court of Appeal would have made a smaller reduction, but it was not unduly lenient. The sentencing remarks showed that the relevant factors had been considered. The appellate court was reviewing the sentence, not sentencing at first instance.

4. The decision to suspend the sentence was also an exercise of sentencing discretion. The judge had considered rehabilitation, personal mitigation, the impact of immediate custody on others, public risk, punishment and compliance with court orders. Although some members of the court might not have suspended the sentence, the judge was entitled to do so. Subsequent engagement with probation and emerging appreciation of the harm caused supported leaving the order in place.

5. The court also endorsed the principle that a guideline starting point for strangulation does not determine the outcome mechanically: each case turns on its own facts.

6. As an additional point, even where a sentence is considered unduly lenient, the court retains a discretion whether to exercise its statutory powers, as noted in Attorney General’s Reference No 4 of 1989 at page 371.

• Crown Court at Canterbury: the Recorder imposed an 18-month custodial sentence suspended for 24 months, with unpaid work, rehabilitation requirements and a restraining order.
• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): leave to refer the sentence was refused and the reference was refused: [2025] EWCA Crim 1410.