R v BCZ

For an offence under the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, “wilfully” requires more than a deliberate application of force. In a charge based on assault, the prosecution must prove that the defendant intended, or was reckless as to whether, the manner of the assault was likely to cause the child unnecessary suffering or injury to health. At minimum, recklessness requires awareness of that risk. The court left unresolved whether it must also have been unreasonable for the defendant to take the risk when recklessness concerns conduct rather than a result. A conviction is unsafe where the jury was not directed on this mens rea, the evidence did not address the defendant’s awareness of risk, and the omissions cannot fairly be cured on appeal.

The appellant was convicted at Luton Crown Court of child cruelty under section 1(1) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, after being acquitted of three charges concerning his wife. The prosecution case was that he had twisted or pulled his four-year-old son’s ear. The trial judge directed the jury that “wilfully” meant deliberately, but did not direct them on intention or recklessness as to the risk of unnecessary suffering or injury.

On appeal, the Crown conceded that the directions were deficient but argued that the conviction remained safe. The appellant argued that the jury had not been directed on the required mens rea and that the evidence did not establish awareness of risk. The central issues were the content of recklessness and whether the conviction could safely stand.

1. Disposition. The appeal was allowed and the conviction was quashed as unsafe. The Crown Prosecution Service was given seven days to inform the court whether it would seek a retrial.
2. Required mens rea. The court held that the trial directions were inadequate. In a charge under section 1(1) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 based on assault, “wilfully” requires a mental state directed to the manner of the assault. The prosecution must prove intention or recklessness as to whether that manner was likely to cause unnecessary suffering or injury to health. A direction confined to the deliberate application of unlawful force was insufficient.
3. Recklessness. The court treated R v Sheppard [1981] AC 394 as requiring mens rea directed to the relevant act and its manner, read in light of R v G [2003] UKHL 50 and [2004] 1 AC 1034. The jury should at least have been asked whether the appellant was aware of the risk that the manner of the assault was likely to cause unnecessary suffering or injury. The court did not decide whether the further requirement that it was unreasonable to take the risk applies where recklessness concerns conduct or manner rather than result.
4. Safety of conviction. The appellant’s evidence, at its highest, was that he intended to discipline his son but did not intend to hurt him. Recklessness was therefore a live issue. He had not been asked whether he foresaw a risk of harm, and the jury had not considered that question. The evidential and directions gaps could not fairly be filled by appellate inference. To do so would usurp the functions of the trial and jury.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): On 14 November 2025, the appeal against conviction was allowed and the conviction was quashed as unsafe: [2025] EWCA Crim 1465.
2. Luton Crown Court: On 4 October 2024, a jury convicted the appellant of child cruelty and acquitted him of three other charges. On 9 December 2024, he received an 18-month conditional discharge.