R v Erlind Demiraj

A jury’s function in a criminal trial is to decide whether it is sure of each defendant’s guilt. It need not undertake a wider inquiry to establish the truth of every factual matter. That direction is compatible with directions requiring jurors to decide whether a particular witness is truthful. A judge’s observation comparing the value of cross-examination with trial by jury will not ordinarily misdirect the jury where the summing-up properly addresses hearsay evidence and its consequences. Comments made only in a hearsay ruling cannot confuse the jury if they were not shown to it. Alleged inconsistencies in directions must be assessed in their full context when deciding whether a conviction is unsafe.

R v Erlind Demiraj arose from convictions at the Crown Court at Reading for conspiracy to blackmail and conspiracy to kidnap. The applicant was sentenced to a total of 16 years’ imprisonment. After a single judge refused leave, he renewed his application and sought an extension of 288 days.

The sole proposed ground alleged that the trial judge had given contradictory directions concerning the jury’s role in discovering the truth, including comments about witness credibility, cross-examination and the admission of hearsay statements under the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The central issue was whether the directions were confusing or misleading so as to make the convictions unsafe.

The application for an extension of time and the renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction were refused.

1. The court held that the judge’s direction that the jury was not in court to discover the truth was proper and comprehensible. The jury’s task was to decide whether it was sure that each defendant was guilty of the relevant charge. It was not required to embark on a wider inquiry into all factual matters, speculate about evidence that had not been called, or speculate about the motives of those involved.
2. There was no inconsistency between that direction and directions requiring the jury to decide whether a particular witness was telling the truth. The two directions addressed different questions, and the distinction would have been understood by the jury.
3. The judge’s observation comparing the contribution of cross-examination with that of trial by jury was merely an observation about trial procedure. It did not undermine the defence submissions or distract from the proper directions concerning the difficulties caused by hearsay evidence. The admission of the complainants’ statements under section 116 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 was not itself challenged.
4. The reference to truth in the ruling concerning hearsay was irrelevant to the safety of the convictions because that ruling was not before the jury. The court also endorsed the single judge’s assessment that the comments had to be read against the clear written legal directions, the summing-up of the defence case, and the directions on credibility and logical fact-finding.

In none of the respects alleged had the judge misdirected the jury. The convictions were not arguably unsafe.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): On 23 October 2025, the court refused the 288-day extension of time and the renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction: [2025] EWCA Crim 1468.
• Single judge: Mrs Justice Jefford DBE refused leave to appeal.
• Crown Court at Reading: The applicant was convicted on 24 August 2023 and sentenced on 12 December 2023 to a total of 16 years’ imprisonment.