R v Faiyaz Bajwa

When sentencing sexual offences against a child, the guideline’s allowance for basic psychological harm does not prevent the sentencer from finding additional, including severe, harm. Expert evidence is not required; victim evidence, including a victim personal statement, may suffice. If severe harm is just established, the offence may remain in the higher harm category, but the starting point should be adjusted downwards to reflect the borderline evidence. Extreme youth does not automatically establish particular vulnerability; the assessment is fact-sensitive. Where several offences arise from one day’s course of conduct, it is preferable to identify the most serious offence as the lead offence, aggravate it for the others, and apply totality. A manifestly excessive sentence may be quashed and replaced by a proportionate sentence.

The appellant, aged 23 at sentence, pleaded guilty at the Crown Court at Reading to six sexual offences arising from online communications and indecent images involving an eight-year-old complainant. HHJ Rowley imposed concurrent sentences totalling four years’ imprisonment, treating severe psychological harm and particular vulnerability due to extreme youth as relevant guideline factors. The appellant appealed with leave, arguing that the harm and vulnerability categorisations produced excessive starting points. At the hearing he accepted that a sentence nearer three years was appropriate and did not pursue suspension. The central issue was whether the overall sentence was manifestly excessive, having regard to the evidence of psychological harm, the complainant’s vulnerability and totality.

The appeal was allowed in part. The sentence was manifestly excessive, although the court did not accept all the appellant’s proposed guideline categorisations.

1. For count 4, the offence involved culpability category A and was properly placed in harm category 2A because the evidence established severe psychological harm. The complainant’s mother’s victim impact evidence was sufficient for that finding. Expert evidence was not required. The evidence only just met the severe-harm threshold, so the eight-year starting point required a downward adjustment to six years. The complainant’s age of eight did not, on these facts, establish particular vulnerability due to extreme youth or personal circumstances.

2. Count 1 should have been categorised as 1B, with a one-year starting point. Counts 2 and 3 were properly categorised as 2B, with six-year starting points. There was no issue with the categorisation of counts 5 and 6.

3. Because all the offending occurred on one day and represented a course of conduct, it was preferable to treat count 4 as the lead offence and the other offences as aggravating features. The resulting notional starting point was approximately six and a half years before credit for the guilty pleas and personal mitigation. Applying totality and standing back from the case as a whole, the just and proportionate sentence was three years and three months.

4. The sentences on counts 2, 3 and 4 were quashed. Concurrent sentences of two years and six months were imposed on counts 2 and 3, and three years and three months on count 4. The other sentences remained in force.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) In [2025] EWCA Crim 1496, the court allowed the sentence appeal in part, quashed the sentences on counts 2, 3 and 4, and resentenced those counts.
• Crown Court at Reading HHJ Rowley sentenced the appellant to concurrent terms totalling four years’ imprisonment on 1 November 2024.