R v Michael Ward

In a circumstantial case, a submission of no case to answer fails where a reasonable jury could safely convict on a reasonable assessment of the prosecution evidence. DNA evidence must be assessed in its factual setting. A DNA-only case may properly be left to the jury, and the cogency of the evidence depends in particular on any plausible alternative explanation for its presence.

Relevant considerations include the article’s connection with the offence, its mobility, geographic links, whether the defendant is the major DNA contributor, and the relative likelihood of primary and secondary transfer. A court must not ordinarily draw an adverse inference from silence when deciding a no-case submission founded on DNA evidence.

The appellant was convicted in the Crown Court at Oxford of conspiracy to commit burglary and theft. The prosecution alleged that he was the fourth person who escaped after three co-conspirators were found near stolen vehicles.

The principal evidence against him was a mixed DNA profile on the inner waistband of jeans hidden in a hotel lavatory near the location of the arrests. He was the major contributor. The jeans also bore glass fragments matching glass broken during a burglary earlier that day. The experts accepted that secondary DNA transfer was possible and that the timing of any DNA deposit could not be established.

On appeal, the appellant contended that the judge should have upheld his submission of no case to answer. He also challenged the judge’s description of the glass evidence.

1. Appeal dismissed. The conviction was not unsafe. The judge correctly rejected the submission of no case to answer and left the case to the jury.
2. In a circumstantial case, the question is whether a reasonable jury could safely convict on a reasonable assessment of the prosecution evidence. The court applied that approach, referring to R v Goddard [2012] EWCA Crim 1756.
3. The court applied the guidance in R v Tsekiri [2017] EWCA Crim 40. The presence of a person’s DNA alone does not create a legal or evidential bar to leaving a case to the jury. Its cogency depends on the facts, including whether there is a plausible alternative explanation. The relevant factors included the article’s connection with the offence, whether it was moveable, geographical association, major-contributor status, and the relative likelihood of primary and secondary transfer.
4. Although secondary transfer was scientifically possible, the evidence permitted a jury to regard it as theoretical or fanciful. The appellant was the major contributor of DNA located on the inner waistband, which was suggestive of wearing the jeans. The jeans were closely linked to the burglary by matching glass fragments. Their concealment near the other offenders and stolen vehicles provided further circumstantial evidence. The case was stronger than Tsekiri, in which a conviction based on a single DNA sample on a car door was safe.
5. Following R v FNC [2015] EWCA Crim 1732, an adverse inference from silence could not ordinarily be drawn when determining the DNA-based no-case submission. However, at that stage there was no material undermining the prosecution case or the inferences which the jury might draw from the DNA evidence. The later, unchallenged direction concerning the appellant’s failure to give evidence allowed an adverse inference only as support for the prosecution case and never as the sole basis for conviction.
6. There was no material error in the judge’s description of the glass evidence. The precise number of matching fragments was immaterial.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Dismissed the appeal against conviction in [2025] EWCA Crim 150.
• Crown Court at Oxford: The appellant was convicted by a jury on 19 February 2024 of conspiracy to commit burglary and theft.